Buyer/security impact
validate_analysis_job_request currently rejects explicit .. path segments for localSource.sourcePath, cacheRoot, and tempRoot, but a prior security PR demonstrated that Windows drive-relative forms such as C:.. can bypass the simple separator/split check. The prior PR was closed after its branch was found to include unrelated dependency/lockfile drift and a weakened secret-scan ignore; none of that prior-head evidence is reusable.
Required implementation
Create a clean test-first security slice from protected develop that:
- explicitly defines whether each field accepts absolute, relative, drive-relative, UNC, and device paths;
- rejects parent traversal and Windows drive-relative traversal without over-rejecting legitimate paths;
- canonicalizes and enforces containment at the filesystem authority boundary before read/write use, rather than relying solely on lexical substring checks;
- treats symlink/reparse-point behavior as part of the authority check where relevant;
- adds POSIX and Windows adversarial cases including mixed separators, drive-relative forms, UNC/device paths, dot segments, repeated separators, and normalization edge cases;
- adds property/fuzz coverage where practical;
- keeps errors payload/path safe;
- makes no dependency, package-lock,
.trivyignore, workflow, model, or unrelated product change;
- updates
CHANGELOG.md and security/doctoring material with current authoritative primary references and APA 7 entries for any normative security claim.
Merge gate
Require exact-current-head unit/integration tests, owned production statement and branch coverage 100%, public API docstrings 100%, CI, SAST, security, supply-chain checks, independent automated review, zero unresolved actionable threads, and qualifying independent non-author approval. Do not bypass repository protections or treat prior/queued/skipped evidence as success.
Supersedes the abandoned implementation attempt in #825.
Buyer/security impact
validate_analysis_job_requestcurrently rejects explicit..path segments forlocalSource.sourcePath,cacheRoot, andtempRoot, but a prior security PR demonstrated that Windows drive-relative forms such asC:..can bypass the simple separator/split check. The prior PR was closed after its branch was found to include unrelated dependency/lockfile drift and a weakened secret-scan ignore; none of that prior-head evidence is reusable.Required implementation
Create a clean test-first security slice from protected
developthat:.trivyignore, workflow, model, or unrelated product change;CHANGELOG.mdand security/doctoring material with current authoritative primary references and APA 7 entries for any normative security claim.Merge gate
Require exact-current-head unit/integration tests, owned production statement and branch coverage 100%, public API docstrings 100%, CI, SAST, security, supply-chain checks, independent automated review, zero unresolved actionable threads, and qualifying independent non-author approval. Do not bypass repository protections or treat prior/queued/skipped evidence as success.
Supersedes the abandoned implementation attempt in #825.