diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index e4b4fb7..84587c3 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ pnpm mainnet:verify         # mainnet read-only proof
 | [docs/ECOSYSTEM.md](./docs/ECOSYSTEM.md) | Passkey-Kit, Smart Account Kit, OZ Relayer |
 | [docs/DEMO_SCRIPT.md](./docs/DEMO_SCRIPT.md) | 5-minute jury walkthrough |
 | [docs/DEPLOY.md](./docs/DEPLOY.md) | Env: UI build vs runtime secrets |
+| [docs/GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md](./docs/GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md) | Repository Actions security settings, including fork PR approval |
 | [docs/LIMITATIONS.md](./docs/LIMITATIONS.md) | Known scope boundaries |
 
 ## Status (submission)
diff --git a/docs/CI.md b/docs/CI.md
index 84cc72a..821c851 100644
--- a/docs/CI.md
+++ b/docs/CI.md
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
 This document describes automated checks that protect the TypeScript workspace
 (`packages/*` and `services/*`).
 
+Repository-level GitHub Actions settings, including the approval policy for fork
+pull request workflows, are recorded in
+[GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md](./GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md).
+
 ## Test coverage gate
 
 The repository enforces a minimum **aggregate line coverage** threshold for
diff --git a/docs/GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md b/docs/GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12629e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/GITHUB_ACTIONS_SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT -->
+# GitHub Actions security configuration
+
+This document records repository-level GitHub Actions security settings so that
+they can be reviewed and checked during audits.
+
+## Fork pull request workflow approval
+
+| Field | Value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Approval policy | `all_external_contributors` |
+| Configured in | Repository **Settings → Actions → General → Fork pull request workflows** |
+| Effective date | 2026-10-23 |
+| Related issue | #487 |
+
+### Why this policy
+
+The previous policy required approval only for first-time contributors. A fork
+account that had contributed before, but was later compromised, could therefore
+start dependency installation and builds without maintainer review. Requiring
+approval for **all** external contributors closes that gap: every workflow run
+from an outside fork waits for an explicit maintainer approval.
+
+### Intended access for internal users
+
+The approval policy applies to external contributors. Members of the owning
+organization and trusted internal collaborators are not treated as external
+contributors, so their existing workflow access is unchanged. Repository
+administrators can confirm the policy in the settings page above or through the
+API:
+
+```sh
+gh api repos/OWNER/REPO/actions/permissions/fork-pr-contributor-approval
+```
+
+The expected response is:
+
+```json
+{"approval_policy":"all_external_contributors"}
+```
+
+### Secret exposure
+
+Approval of a fork workflow run does **not** grant it repository secrets. The
+workflows in this repository:
+
+- use `pull_request`, never `pull_request_target`;
+- declare `permissions: contents: read` only;
+- do not reference `secrets.*`.
+
+Workflows from forks of a public repository therefore run without repository
+secrets. Keep it that way: do not add `pull_request_target` or secret references
+to a workflow that checks out or executes untrusted fork code.
+
+### Operational notes
+
+- Approval requests appear on the pull request's **Checks** tab and in the
+  Actions run list.
+- Maintainers should review the workflow diff before approving a fork run.
+- Do not post tokens, account identifiers, or other sensitive details when
+  recording this setting in an issue.