Testnet prototype. Not audited. Ethereum Sepolia + Mezo testnet only. Never use with real funds.
| Party | Trusted for | Not trusted for |
|---|---|---|
| User | Nothing. All of their inputs are signed and checked on chain. | Cannot take WBTC without the solver being repaid; cannot reuse an intent (nonce). |
| Solver | Liveness only (running the Mezo leg after the Ethereum leg). | Cannot change amounts (every field is user-signed; Mezo verifies its own signature). Cannot take more than it repaid if it stalls (timeout split). |
| Wormhole guardians | Attesting that FerryMezo emitted the proof (13-of-19 on mainnet; testnet guardian set). | A missing attestation never loses funds; it triggers the timeout refund. |
| Aave oracle | Pricing the timeout refund split only. | Not used in the happy path. |
| Mezo MUSD contracts | Opening the trove exactly as the user signed. | Ferry reads the trove back and checks status, collateral and MUSD received. |
| FerryMezo owner | ping (test messages) and rescue of tokens sent to FerryMezo by mistake. FerryMezo holds no balance between transactions. |
Cannot touch escrows, troves or proofs. |
| FerryEscrow | — | Has no owner, no admin, no upgrade path. |
| Risk | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Debt asset changes | The user owes MUSD instead of USDC/USDT. | Stated in the UI before signing and in the docs. |
| Liquidation at 110% MCR | Trove can be liquidated if ICR < 110%. | Ferry requires ICR ≥ 120%, warns below 150%, shows the liquidation price. |
| Recovery Mode | If system TCR < 150%, troves below 150% can be liquidated and withdrawals are blocked. | checkRecoveryMode before every quote and every Mezo leg; in Recovery Mode new troves must be ≥ 150%. |
| Promotional rate | Mezo's 1% rate is promotional (1–5% range); it is fixed per trove at open. | Live rate read from InterestRateManager; disclosed. |
| Min debt | Net debt must be ≥ 1,800 MUSD; +200 MUSD gas compensation (returned on close). | Rejected up front. |
| Bridge risk | Escrow release depends on Wormhole. | No loss path: missing proof → timeout refund; republish for missed observations. |
| Solver liveness | Solver might stop after the Ethereum leg. | Permissionless refund after timeout (6 h; 5 min on the demo escrow). |
| One trove per address | Mezo constraint. | Detected before signing; stretch goal: addCollWithSignature / withdrawMUSDWithSignature. |
| Threat | Defence | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Forged / tampered intent | EIP-712 signature over every field (SignatureChecker, supports ERC-1271) |
test_ethLeg_revertsOnBadSignature, …OnTamperedIntent |
| Intent replay | Per-user nonce + intentId status | test_ethLeg_revertsOnReplay |
| Expired intent | Deadline check | test_ethLeg_revertsWhenExpired |
| Repaying more than authorised | debt ≤ maxDebtRepay; exact debt read in the same tx |
test_ethLeg_revertsWhenDebtExceedsMax, …debtGrewButWithinMax |
| Partially closed position | Require total Aave debt = 0 after repay | test_ethLeg_revertsWhenPositionNotFullyClosed |
| Permit griefing (front-run) | try permit + allowance check |
test_ethLeg_toleratesFrontRunPermit |
| Fake proof | parseAndVerifyVM + emitter chain (50) + emitter address (FerryMezo) |
…revertsOnInvalidVaa, …WrongEmitterAddress, …WrongEmitterChain |
| Proof for a different trove | Payload user / collateral ≥ promised / debt within [authorised + 200, +1% fee] | test_finalize_revertsOnWrongPayload, test_proofMatches_bounds |
| VAA replay | Consumed VAA hash + escrow status | test_finalize_revertsOnVaaReplay, test_finalize_withRepublishedProof |
| Wrong payload version (ping) | Version read before decoding | test_finalize_rejectsPingVersion |
| Refund steals equity | Solver share = value of debtRepaid at Aave oracle, rounded down, capped; one rounding step |
testFuzz_refundMaths, test_refund_* |
| Reentrancy via token hooks | Transient-storage nonReentrant + checks-effects-interactions |
FerryReentrancy.t.sol |
| Accounting drift | Invariant: escrow WBTC = Σ Pending escrows; conservation in = pending + released | FerryEscrow.invariant.t.sol (256 runs) |
| Mezo leg underfunded by solver | Mezo verifies assetAmount == msg.value in the user's signature; FerryMezo checks the trove's collateral |
test_mezoLeg_revertsOnWrongCollateralForSignature |
| Front-running the Mezo leg | Signature recipient is FerryMezo; WBTC always goes to the escrow's recorded solver | design (see ARCHITECTURE.md) |
Slither results and how each finding was handled are recorded below.
Slither runs in CI on every push (.github/workflows/ci.yml, job slither, fails on medium+). It could not run on the
author's Windows machine (an application-control policy blocks its native Python modules). Expected informational findings and
why they are accepted:
| Detector | Where | Why it is acceptable |
|---|---|---|
timestamp |
deadlines, refundableAt |
Intended: deadlines and the timeout are coarse (minutes–hours); miner skew is irrelevant. |
reentrancy-benign / reentrancy-events |
executeEthLeg, executeMezoLeg |
All entry points are nonReentrant (transient guard); external calls are to Aave, MUSD and Wormhole. Proven by FerryReentrancy.t.sol. |
unused-return |
pool.withdraw, aToken.permit (try) |
The withdrawn amount is measured by balance difference; permit failure is tolerated by design and the allowance is checked. |
arbitrary-send-eth / low-level-calls |
FerryMezo.rescue |
onlyOwner; FerryMezo holds no balance between transactions. |
- Single collateral (WBTC) and single stablecoin debt per migration; the full aWBTC balance is moved.
- Solver is a single operator (roadmap: open network of bonded solvers).
MAX_MEZO_FEE_BPS(1%) bounds the Mezo borrowing fee in the proof check; if Mezo governance raised the fee above 1%,finalizewould reject and the timeout refund would apply.- Testnet oracles differ between chains (Aave WBTC $60,000 vs Mezo BTC ≈ $68,000); each chain's own oracle is used for that chain's checks.