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chore(libdd-data-pipeline): solve cargo deny [APMSP-3884] - #2318

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chore(libdd-data-pipeline): solve cargo deny [APMSP-3884]#2318
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@Eldolfin

@Eldolfin Eldolfin commented Aug 5, 2026

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What does this PR do?

Solve cargo deny errors in libdd-data-pipeline by updating some dependencies.

Motivation

What inspired you to submit this pull request?

Additional Notes

Sadly, updating time requires a bump in our MSRV from 1.87.0 to 1.88.0, this can be done in a separate PR.

How to test the change?

Describe here in detail how the change can be validated.

@datadog-prod-us1-4

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Tests

🎉 All green!

🧪 All tests passed
❄️ No new flaky tests detected

🎯 Code Coverage (details)
• Patch Coverage: 100.00%
• Overall Coverage: 75.40% (+0.37%)

This comment will be updated automatically if new data arrives.
🔗 Commit SHA: a2f97f1 | Docs | Datadog PR Page | Give us feedback!

@Eldolfin
ignore RUSTSEC-2026-0009 until MSRV bump
2021264 
We cannot update `time` before bumping our MSRV.

Also we're not affected by this because there is no user provided input
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Artifact Size Benchmark Report

aarch64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 87.79 MB 87.80 MB +.01% (+9.59 KB) 🔍
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 8.07 MB 8.07 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 99.03 MB 99.02 MB -0% (-7.13 KB) 👌
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.88 MB 10.88 MB -0% (-448 B) 👌
libdatadog-x64-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 26.22 MB 26.24 MB +.07% (+20.50 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 89.92 KB 89.92 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 188.69 MB 188.75 MB +.02% (+56.00 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 985.29 MB 984.37 MB --.09% (-945.32 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 8.56 MB 8.56 MB --.03% (-3.00 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 89.92 KB 89.92 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 25.22 MB 25.20 MB --.06% (-16.00 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 50.23 MB 50.02 MB --.41% (-211.42 KB) 💪
libdatadog-x86-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 22.85 MB 22.86 MB +.05% (+13.50 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 91.33 KB 91.33 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 193.48 MB 193.57 MB +.04% (+96.00 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 974.09 MB 974.12 MB +0% (+36.26 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 6.61 MB 6.61 MB +0% (+512 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 91.33 KB 91.33 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 27.12 MB 27.12 MB +.02% (+8.00 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 47.82 MB 47.63 MB --.39% (-192.12 KB) 💪
x86_64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 78.32 MB 78.33 MB +.01% (+11.79 KB) 🔍
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 9.01 MB 9.01 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 93.81 MB 93.81 MB +0% (+3.50 KB) 👌
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.97 MB 10.97 MB +0% (+256 B) 👌

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Benchmarks

Comparison

Benchmark execution time: 2026-08-06 14:06:12

Comparing candidate commit a2f97f1 in PR branch oscarld/solve-cargo-deny-on-libdd-data-pipeline with baseline commit d50e49c in branch main.

Found 12 performance improvements and 23 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 105 metrics, 0 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:msgpack_decoder::v05/low_sharing/10000

  • 🟩 execution_time [-844.218µs; -838.767µs] or [-4.718%; -4.688%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+27493.940op/s; +27675.367op/s] or [+4.919%; +4.952%]

scenario:msgpack_decoder::v05/low_sharing/200

  • 🟩 execution_time [-17.257µs; -15.705µs] or [-4.796%; -4.364%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+25577.360op/s; +27562.435op/s] or [+4.601%; +4.958%]

scenario:msgpack_decoder::v05/low_sharing/2000

  • 🟩 execution_time [-160.063µs; -158.722µs] or [-4.471%; -4.434%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+25925.285op/s; +26150.190op/s] or [+4.640%; +4.680%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_name/normalize_name/Too-Long-.Too-Long-.Too-Long-.Too-Long-.Too-Long-.Too-Lo...

  • 🟥 execution_time [+18.895µs; +19.113µs] or [+10.141%; +10.258%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-499452.730op/s; -493999.894op/s] or [-9.306%; -9.204%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_name/normalize_name/bad-name

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.054µs; +2.111µs] or [+12.046%; +12.382%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-6467684.140op/s; -6298758.858op/s] or [-11.027%; -10.739%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_name/normalize_name/good

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.255µs; +1.309µs] or [+12.582%; +13.126%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-11700036.736op/s; -11184116.362op/s] or [-11.665%; -11.151%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_service/normalize_service/A0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000...

  • 🟥 execution_time [+36.111µs; +36.449µs] or [+7.238%; +7.306%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-136543.151op/s; -135241.968op/s] or [-6.812%; -6.747%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_service/normalize_service/Test Conversion 0f Weird !@#$%^&**() Characters

  • 🟥 execution_time [+19.010µs; +19.132µs] or [+11.138%; +11.210%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-590666.087op/s; -587074.799op/s] or [-10.081%; -10.020%]

scenario:normalization/normalize_service/normalize_service/test_ASCII

  • 🟩 execution_time [-2.794µs; -2.757µs] or [-5.770%; -5.694%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1247446.720op/s; +1264215.938op/s] or [+6.040%; +6.121%]

scenario:profile_serialize_compressed_pprof_timestamped_x1000

  • 🟩 execution_time [-52.259µs; -51.402µs] or [-5.352%; -5.265%]

scenario:profiles_dictionary/profile_string_inserts/threads/1

  • 🟥 execution_time [+20.296µs; +23.267µs] or [+6.734%; +7.720%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-244866.223op/s; -213235.575op/s] or [-7.207%; -6.276%]

scenario:vec_map/as_deduped_map/already_deduped/16

  • 🟩 execution_time [-9.867ns; -9.844ns] or [-29.557%; -29.488%]

scenario:vec_map/as_deduped_map/already_deduped/8

  • 🟩 execution_time [-1.825ns; -1.803ns] or [-11.633%; -11.490%]

scenario:vec_map/contains_key/16

  • 🟥 execution_time [+17.459ns; +17.842ns] or [+7.563%; +7.729%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-4975483.162op/s; -4869777.620op/s] or [-7.179%; -7.026%]

scenario:vec_map/dedup/no_duplicates/8

  • 🟥 execution_time [+14.211ns; +18.401ns] or [+4.115%; +5.329%]

scenario:vec_map/get_miss/16

  • 🟥 execution_time [+0.616ns; +0.733ns] or [+7.020%; +8.348%]

scenario:vec_map/get_miss/64

  • 🟩 execution_time [-27.891ns; -27.781ns] or [-49.351%; -49.157%]

scenario:vec_map/get_miss/8

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.266ns; +2.275ns] or [+43.269%; +43.458%]

scenario:vec_map/get_mut/128

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.647µs; +1.749µs] or [+11.485%; +12.200%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-973572.302op/s; -914409.315op/s] or [-10.904%; -10.241%]

scenario:vec_map/get_mut/16

  • 🟥 execution_time [+19.043ns; +30.228ns] or [+6.890%; +10.937%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-6273490.332op/s; -4046538.278op/s] or [-10.696%; -6.899%]

scenario:vec_map/get_mut/64

  • 🟥 execution_time [+353.016ns; +392.064ns] or [+8.981%; +9.975%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-1486068.857op/s; -1335456.405op/s] or [-9.121%; -8.197%]

Benchmark execution time: 2026-08-06 14:16:50

Comparing candidate commit a2f97f1 in PR branch oscarld/solve-cargo-deny-on-libdd-data-pipeline with baseline commit d50e49c in branch main.

Found 21 performance improvements and 11 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 136 metrics, 10 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:alloc_free/system/16

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.380ns; +1.422ns] or [+9.669%; +9.963%]

scenario:alloc_free/system/256

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.380ns; +1.416ns] or [+9.658%; +9.913%]

scenario:alloc_free/system/4096

  • 🟥 execution_time [+13.979ns; +14.089ns] or [+17.505%; +17.643%]

scenario:alloc_free/system/64

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.362ns; +1.405ns] or [+9.536%; +9.838%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/ 3782-8224-6310-005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-6.404µs; -6.226µs] or [-7.903%; -7.683%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1028055.868op/s; +1058998.095op/s] or [+8.331%; +8.582%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/ 378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-5.967µs; -5.882µs] or [-8.094%; -7.980%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1177421.732op/s; +1193193.572op/s] or [+8.680%; +8.796%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-6.161µs; -6.079µs] or [-8.712%; -8.596%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1331335.402op/s; +1347922.107op/s] or [+9.414%; +9.531%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/37828224631000521389798

  • 🟩 execution_time [-7.953µs; -7.910µs] or [-14.950%; -14.870%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+3283952.780op/s; +3304312.439op/s] or [+17.469%; +17.578%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/x371413321323331

  • 🟩 execution_time [-418.299ns; -413.906ns] or [-6.476%; -6.408%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+10604731.885op/s; +10714097.403op/s] or [+6.850%; +6.921%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/ 378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-5.413µs; -5.376µs] or [-9.257%; -9.195%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1732724.998op/s; +1743726.586op/s] or [+10.131%; +10.196%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-5.729µs; -5.674µs] or [-10.300%; -10.200%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+2043730.225op/s; +2062338.179op/s] or [+11.368%; +11.472%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/37828224631000521389798

  • 🟩 execution_time [-7.941µs; -7.900µs] or [-14.931%; -14.854%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+3280587.535op/s; +3300307.252op/s] or [+17.447%; +17.552%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/x371413321323331

  • 🟩 execution_time [-413.069ns; -410.114ns] or [-6.401%; -6.355%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+10518599.876op/s; +10592071.747op/s] or [+6.788%; +6.836%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/name_pattern_rule_not_matching/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+23.463ns; +23.551ns] or [+15.091%; +15.147%]

scenario:ddsketch_encode/encode_to_vec/large_values

  • 🟩 execution_time [-43.431ns; -38.239ns] or [-4.921%; -4.333%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_case_insensitive_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.813ns; +1.906ns] or [+6.589%; +6.924%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+1.803ns; +1.884ns] or [+6.549%; +6.844%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_miss/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.254ns; +2.292ns] or [+18.088%; +18.393%]

scenario:glob_matcher/unicode_pattern_wildcard_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+8.015ns; +8.107ns] or [+6.296%; +6.369%]

scenario:ip_address/quantize_peer_ip_address_benchmark

  • 🟩 execution_time [-232.636ns; -211.928ns] or [-4.488%; -4.088%]

scenario:profiler_attached/fast_path_system/4096

  • 🟥 execution_time [+6.982ns; +7.145ns] or [+7.163%; +7.330%]

scenario:single_flag_killswitch/rules-based

  • 🟥 execution_time [+18.720ns; +20.998ns] or [+11.730%; +13.158%]

scenario:sql/obfuscate_sql_string

  • 🟩 execution_time [-18.899µs; -18.682µs] or [-6.177%; -6.106%]

Candidate

Omitted due to size.

Baseline

Omitted due to size.

@Eldolfin
Eldolfin marked this pull request as ready for review August 5, 2026 14:58
@Eldolfin
Eldolfin requested a review from a team as a code owner August 5, 2026 14:58
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Comment thread Cargo.lock
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@Eldolfin
Eldolfin requested review from a team as code owners August 6, 2026 12:58
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📚 Documentation Check Results

⚠️ 8178 documentation warning(s) found

📦 datadog-sidecar - 2837 warning(s)

📦 libdd-common - 169 warning(s)

📦 libdd-crashtracker - 1106 warning(s)

📦 libdd-data-pipeline - 1235 warning(s)

📦 libdd-ddsketch - 8 warning(s)

📦 libdd-library-config - 265 warning(s)

📦 libdd-profiling - 650 warning(s)

📦 libdd-trace-normalization - 244 warning(s)

📦 libdd-trace-stats - 901 warning(s)

📦 libdd-trace-utils - 763 warning(s)

Updated: 2026-08-06 13:37:26 UTC | Commit: 5eec92a | missing-docs job results

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🔒 Cargo Deny Results

⚠️ 5 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)

📦 datadog-sidecar - 1 error(s)

Show output 
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:37:1
   │
37 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0
     │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
     └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-common - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:63:1
   │
63 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-common v5.1.0

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:63:1
   │
63 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             └── libdd-common v5.1.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-crashtracker - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-data-pipeline - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-ddsketch - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-library-config - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-profiling - 2 error(s)

Show output 
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:78:1
   │
78 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │       └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:78:1
   │
78 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │       └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-trace-normalization - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-trace-stats - ✅ No issues

📦 libdd-trace-utils - ✅ No issues

Updated: 2026-08-06 13:38:04 UTC | Commit: 5eec92a | dependency-check job results

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@brettlangdon brettlangdon brettlangdon approved these changes
@mabdinur mabdinur Awaiting requested review from mabdinur mabdinur is a code owner automatically assigned from DataDog/apm-sdk-capabilities-rust

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@Eldolfin @brettlangdon