Email gdg@psu.edu with a description, steps to reproduce and the impact. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability, and do not include other members' data or live credentials in the report.
This is a student-run project with no formal response time. Organizers acknowledge reports as soon as they can and coordinate a fix before anything is made public.
Only the current main branch is supported.
- Identity: Supabase Auth, email and password. Accounts exist by invitation only; there is no public sign-up. Organizers also verify an authenticator app.
- Authorization: every page, server action and route handler checks the
session and the role on the server. Roles come from
user_roles, never from metadata or an email address. Member data is also protected by Postgres RLS. - Points and stars: append-only ledgers; a balance is a sum. Grants, reversals and reward requests run in SQL functions only the server can call, with idempotency keys and row locks.
- Attendance: reading a card, scanning a QR code or finding a member by name only creates a preview. An organizer checks the person against their photo and confirms.
- Cards: a card holds one opaque HTTPS link and can be copied, so holding one authorizes nothing. Links are stored hashed, with a sealed copy for the owner's own digital ID.
- Card readers: a reader holds a key of its own and obeys only a session
opened with it, over its cable or over Bluetooth. The site stores that key
sealed and never gives it to a browser for a session: the server answers the
handshake for a signed-in organizer and returns a key for that one session,
under which every line is sealed with AES-256-GCM. See
docs/usb-api.md, including what this does not protect against. - One-time links: invitations and password resets are links the app issues itself. Only the token's hash is stored, a link works once, for 72 or 48 hours, and opening one does not spend it.
- Public data: explicit projections with per-field visibility enforced in the database. Internal IDs, card data and notes are never public.
- Audit: an append-only log with the actor and reason. Nothing can update or delete an entry, and it never holds a secret, a card link or a one-time link.
- Secrets: the Supabase service key, the encryption key and the database
URL live in ignored env files and in the host's settings. Nothing secret is
prefixed
NEXT_PUBLIC_or compiled into the reader's firmware. - Headers: a CSP,
X-Content-Type-Options,Referrer-Policy, framing denial and a permissions policy, inapps/web/next.config.ts.
- Never commit
.env*(except.env.example), service keys, card links, one-time links, reader keys or real member data. - Never prefix a secret with
NEXT_PUBLIC_. - Never put a Supabase key on a reader.
- Do not paste secrets into chats, issues, screenshots or test reports.
- When a reader comes back after being out of your hands, use Rotate key before trusting it.
- The server holds a service key for organizer operations, so a server compromise is high impact.
- A one-time link is as sensitive as a password until it is used, and it is delivered by hand.
- A reader's flash is not encrypted. Someone with the reader and a flashing tool can read its key or replace its firmware.
- Email is public on a profile unless the member hides it.
- The public read APIs have no rate limit, and no load test has been run.
- No secret scanning or dependency audit runs in CI, and no backup restore has been rehearsed.
docs/threat-model.md has the full threat table, and docs/test-plan.md what
has and has not been tested.