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Security: GDG-PSU/members

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email gdg@psu.edu with a description, steps to reproduce and the impact. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability, and do not include other members' data or live credentials in the report.

This is a student-run project with no formal response time. Organizers acknowledge reports as soon as they can and coordinate a fix before anything is made public.

Only the current main branch is supported.

The security model in brief

  • Identity: Supabase Auth, email and password. Accounts exist by invitation only; there is no public sign-up. Organizers also verify an authenticator app.
  • Authorization: every page, server action and route handler checks the session and the role on the server. Roles come from user_roles, never from metadata or an email address. Member data is also protected by Postgres RLS.
  • Points and stars: append-only ledgers; a balance is a sum. Grants, reversals and reward requests run in SQL functions only the server can call, with idempotency keys and row locks.
  • Attendance: reading a card, scanning a QR code or finding a member by name only creates a preview. An organizer checks the person against their photo and confirms.
  • Cards: a card holds one opaque HTTPS link and can be copied, so holding one authorizes nothing. Links are stored hashed, with a sealed copy for the owner's own digital ID.
  • Card readers: a reader holds a key of its own and obeys only a session opened with it, over its cable or over Bluetooth. The site stores that key sealed and never gives it to a browser for a session: the server answers the handshake for a signed-in organizer and returns a key for that one session, under which every line is sealed with AES-256-GCM. See docs/usb-api.md, including what this does not protect against.
  • One-time links: invitations and password resets are links the app issues itself. Only the token's hash is stored, a link works once, for 72 or 48 hours, and opening one does not spend it.
  • Public data: explicit projections with per-field visibility enforced in the database. Internal IDs, card data and notes are never public.
  • Audit: an append-only log with the actor and reason. Nothing can update or delete an entry, and it never holds a secret, a card link or a one-time link.
  • Secrets: the Supabase service key, the encryption key and the database URL live in ignored env files and in the host's settings. Nothing secret is prefixed NEXT_PUBLIC_ or compiled into the reader's firmware.
  • Headers: a CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, framing denial and a permissions policy, in apps/web/next.config.ts.

Handling secrets

  1. Never commit .env* (except .env.example), service keys, card links, one-time links, reader keys or real member data.
  2. Never prefix a secret with NEXT_PUBLIC_.
  3. Never put a Supabase key on a reader.
  4. Do not paste secrets into chats, issues, screenshots or test reports.
  5. When a reader comes back after being out of your hands, use Rotate key before trusting it.

Known limits

  • The server holds a service key for organizer operations, so a server compromise is high impact.
  • A one-time link is as sensitive as a password until it is used, and it is delivered by hand.
  • A reader's flash is not encrypted. Someone with the reader and a flashing tool can read its key or replace its firmware.
  • Email is public on a profile unless the member hides it.
  • The public read APIs have no rate limit, and no load test has been run.
  • No secret scanning or dependency audit runs in CI, and no backup restore has been rehearsed.

docs/threat-model.md has the full threat table, and docs/test-plan.md what has and has not been tested.

There aren't any published security advisories