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perf(mqtt): share payload and QoS 0 packet encoding across topic subscribers - #2040

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perf(mqtt): share payload and QoS 0 packet encoding across topic subscribers#2040
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@kriszyp kriszyp commented Aug 1, 2026

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What

When one message is published to an MQTT topic, every subscriber independently serialized the payload and generated its own PUBLISH packet — even though the output was byte-identical. This computes both once and reuses them across the fan-out.

  • Payload — serialized once per (message, record version, negotiated content type).
  • QoS 0 packet — additionally shared per (payload, topic, protocol version). A QoS 0 PUBLISH carries no message identifier, so the whole packet is identical across those subscribers.
  • QoS 1/2 — packet generation stays per subscriber; the 2-byte message identifier in the variable header differs. A follow-up could pass a small per-subscriber header plus the shared payload as a 2-element array to writev (which already accepts a buffer list) to avoid the copy; out of scope here.

Why

Measured, not assumed. A V8 heap snapshot of one worker on a production node at ~127k cluster connections found 157,888 live Subscription objects across only 29 distinct topics — the busiest topics each had ~7,200 subscribers, i.e. ~7,200 structurally identical delivery pipelines per topic. A 6s CPU profile of a worker at 182k connections put essentially every non-GC sample on the per-delivery path (writev 16.4%, the delivery loop 9.8%, buffer _copyActual 9.3%, mqtt.js listener 5.6%, mqtt-packet generate/concat ~2%), with GC at 26.4% — largely the short-lived allocation churn from that duplicated encoding. Harper's CPU scales with deliveries (messages × subscribers), not connections.

Is sharing safe?

serializeMessage(data, request) output varies only on the negotiated content type. It resolves a serializer via findBestSerializer(request), which reads only the Accept header, and every registered serializer (JSONStringify, cbor encode, msgpackr pack) is a pure function of the message. Nothing in the MQTT delivery path applies per-user shaping: attribute-level permissions (attribute_permissionstarget.select) are a REST query-time concern, and the checkPermission gate on subscribe is all-or-nothing eligibility, not per-message redaction. The value delivered is auditRecord.getValue(...) or entry.value straight from the store, unshaped by subscriber identity. So a shared payload cannot cross users.

Sharing is keyed on the message object's identity, which works because the fan-out has a single shared origin — transactionBroadcast dispatches one object to every subscription of a key. Because a custom Resource is not bound by that, the event's record version is part of the key: an entry whose version does not match is re-encoded, and an event with no version is not shared at all. So a Resource that reuses one mutable envelope is correct as long as the version advances, rather than merely being told not to.

Numbers

benchmarks/mqtt-fanout-encoding.js, 200 messages, ms per publish (JSON, MQTT v3.1.1):

subscribers QoS 0 before after QoS 1 before after
1 0.0167 0.0041 0.0023 0.0026
100 0.2044 0.0082 0.1613 0.0819
1000 1.3841 0.0310 1.4572 0.7574

QoS 0 per-publish cost goes from linear in N to roughly flat (44x at 1000 subscribers); QoS 1 gets ~2x from payload sharing alone. At N=1 it is break-even within noise. CBOR shows a larger win (~80-130x at 1000). The benchmark measures encoding wall-time only — the socket writes that follow are unchanged and per-subscriber either way.

Retention

Sharing needs the encoding to outlive one delivery but not the message object — for record events that object is the store's cached record, so an unbounded memo would keep serialized copies and PUBLISH buffers resident for as long as the record stays cached. Two rotating WeakMap generations bound it in time (10s interval, unref'd, stopped when nothing is retained), and a 4 MB per-generation byte budget bounds it in volume.

Test notes

  • Unit (unitTests/server/serverHelpers/sharedMessageEncoding.test.js, 36 tests) — sharing per content type, content-type isolation, the version key invalidating a whole chain, pass-through messages skipping negotiation, retry after a failed serialization, rotation and exact byte accounting, and a shared buffer surviving ws.send to five real clients unmutated.
  • Premise (unitTests/resources/subscriptionValueIdentity.test.js) — two subscribers of a record write receive the same value object, and consecutive versions receive distinct objects. Without this, a change making each subscription decode its own copy would silently revert the optimization with every other test green.
  • Integration (integrationTests/mqtt/mqtt.test.ts, 5 new) — including one that proves the server serializes once per publish regardless of subscriber count, via a fixture content type that stamps the server's serialization counter into the payload. Byte equality holds whether or not sharing works, so this is the only test that can catch a regression to per-subscriber encoding; verified it fails with sharing disabled and passes with it on, while the other four pass either way.
  • Suites: test:unit:main, test:unit:resources (1349), server + serverHelpers (531), test:integration:all (1640 pass / 0 fail). Pre-existing environment failures unrelated to this change are noted in the review.

Review

Seven rounds of independent cross-model review (Codex + Gemini + Grok + Harper-domain adjudication) ran pre-push; the final round returned no majors. Findings fixed along the way included a 406 regression for pass-through messages, a memoized rejection that turned one transient serialization failure permanent, unbounded retention, and a benchmark that had stopped measuring the shared path. Remaining accepted trade-offs are in the self-review.

Dispatched task: no linked issue.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code
\n\n### CI follow-up\n\nBun 1.3.14 kept a private resolver cache across component redeploys and its CommonJS resolver could not resolve import-only package exports. The follow-up tracks resolution candidates and package entries explicitly. The focused redeploy suite passes 18/18 under Node and Bun; the exact Bun 4/6 shard passes 138 with 0 failures.

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Code Review

This pull request introduces a shared message encoding mechanism to optimize MQTT fan-out delivery by serializing messages once per content type and sharing QoS 0 PUBLISH packets across subscribers of a topic. It includes comprehensive benchmarks, integration tests, and unit tests to validate the performance improvements and ensure message identity contracts. The review feedback suggests two improvements: using a more robust check for thenable objects in sharedMessageEncoding.ts to prevent false positives, and adhering to the repository style guide in subscriptionValueIdentity.test.js by using the node: prefix for builtin imports and including file extensions on relative imports.

// A pass-through payload IS the message's own data, already reachable from the WeakMap key, so
// caching it retains nothing extra and must not be billed against the budget.
if (encoding.serializer === PASS_THROUGH) return;
if ((payload as any)?.then)

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medium

When detecting a Promise or thenable object, use typeof value?.then === 'function' instead of a simple truthiness check on value?.then to prevent false positives from non-Promise objects that have a truthy then property.

Suggested change
if ((payload as any)?.then)
if (typeof (payload as any)?.then === 'function')
References
  1. When detecting a Promise or thenable object, use typeof value?.then === 'function' instead of a simple truthiness check on value?.then to prevent false positives from non-Promise objects that have a truthy then property.

Comment on lines +1 to +2
const assert = require('assert');
const { setupTestDBPath } = require('../testUtils');

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medium

Node builtins must use the node: prefix as per the repository style guide constraints. Additionally, relative imports must include the file extension.

Suggested change
const assert = require('assert');
const { setupTestDBPath } = require('../testUtils');
const assert = require('node:assert');
const { setupTestDBPath } = require('../testUtils.js');
References
  1. Node builtins use the node: prefix. These are constraints, not style choices. Relative imports must include the file extension. (link)

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claude Bot commented Aug 1, 2026

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Reviewed; no blockers found.

@kriszyp
kriszyp marked this pull request as ready for review August 1, 2026 03:08
kriszyp and others added 13 commits August 4, 2026 06:15
…cribers

On a high-fan-out topic every subscriber independently serialized the same
message and generated its own PUBLISH packet, even though the output was
byte-identical. A production heap snapshot found ~7,200 subscribers per
distinct topic, so that work was being redone thousands of times per message,
and a CPU profile showed the delivery path (serialization, packet generation,
and the GC churn from their short-lived allocations) dominating the worker.

The fan-out has a single shared origin — transactionBroadcast dispatches the
same message object instance to every subscription of a key — so a WeakMap
keyed on that object lets the first subscriber to encode do the work for all
of them, with no change to subscription lifecycle, ordering, or the per
subscription iterator architecture.

serializeMessage's output varies only on the negotiated content type: it
resolves a serializer from the request's Accept header and every registered
serializer is a pure function of the message. Nothing in the MQTT delivery
path applies per-user shaping — attribute permissions are a REST query-time
concern, and the subscribe-time checkPermission gate is all-or-nothing — so
the memo key is (message, serializer) and a shared payload can never cross
users.

For QoS 0 the whole PUBLISH packet is shared as well, since a QoS 0 PUBLISH
carries no message identifier. The key includes the protocol version because
MQTT v5 emits a properties field that v3.1.1 omits. QoS 1/2 packets stay per
subscriber for their distinct message identifiers; a follow-up can pass a
small per-subscriber header plus the shared payload as a buffer list to
writev to avoid that copy.

Per-subscriber behaviour is unchanged: bytes-sent analytics are still
recorded per subscriber, the writableNeedDrain backpressure wait is
untouched, and ordering is unaffected. Also drops the Math.random() burned on
every QoS 0 delivery for a message identifier mqtt-packet does not emit.

benchmarks/mqtt-fanout-encoding.js, 200 messages, ms per publish:

  QoS 0    1 sub    0.0052 -> 0.0037     1.4x
        1000 subs   1.2301 -> 0.0128    96.3x
  QoS 1    1 sub    0.0017 -> 0.0022     0.8x
        1000 subs   1.3150 -> 0.6917     1.9x

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…codes, retention

Three defects the independent pre-push review found in the shared fan-out
encoding, plus the coverage gap that let the first two through.

Pass-through messages regressed. A message that carries its own
{contentType, data} is delivered verbatim and serializeMessage returns it
before ever negotiating, but getSharedMessageEncoding resolved the serializer
first — so a connection whose Accept header names only unregistered types
threw a 406 inside the outbound listener, and the catch there disconnects the
session. Negotiation is now skipped for those messages, and they share one
entry under a sentinel key since their bytes do not depend on content type.

A failed async serialization was memoized permanently. The derived promise was
stored on the message object with no rejection path, so one transient failure
(a blob read hiccup) disconnected every subscriber that touched that message
for as long as the object stayed in the store's read cache. The rejection now
clears the payload so the next subscriber re-encodes, which is what happened
before this optimization existed.

Retention was scoped to the message object's lifetime rather than the
fan-out's. For record events the message IS the store's cached record, so
serialized copies and whole PUBLISH buffers stayed resident for as long as the
record stayed cached, while sharing is only ever needed for one fan-out. Two
rotating generations now bound it: a fan-out spanning a rotation still hits,
and dropping a generation releases all of it at once.

Also splits getSharedFrame into a lookup and a store so a cache hit — the
whole point on a fan-out — allocates neither the key string nor a generator
closure. That was a per-subscriber allocation on the path the change
advertises as flat, and it brings the single-subscriber case back to parity.

Coverage: the four end-to-end fan-out tests assert bytes, which hold whether
or not the encoding is shared, so none of them could detect a regression to
one serialization per subscriber. The fixture now registers a content type
that stamps the server's serialization counter into the payload, and a new
test asserts four subscribers share one count and two publishes advance it by
exactly one. Verified it fails with sharing disabled and passes with it on,
while the other four pass either way. New unit tests cover the pass-through
bypass and the re-encode after a rejected serialization.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…an-out of one

Round 2 of the independent pre-push review found that the round 1 fixes traded
one problem for another.

Retention was not actually bounded. Rotation was gated on a 256-delivery
counter before it would consult the clock, so a batch that fans out and then
goes quiet — a nightly job, a deploy, a client disconnecting — left the
counter parked below the gate and never rotated again. The bound the design
claims only holds if it does not depend on traffic, so rotation now runs on an
unref'd interval, started on the first insert and stopped once a rotation
finds nothing was retained.

Every QoS 0 delivery populated the frame cache, including a fan-out of one.
Since the cache keys on the message object, and for record events that object
is the store's cached record, a single-subscriber topic pinned a whole PUBLISH
buffer per record for the rest of its retention window — a heap regression
where the change buys nothing. The encoding now counts reuses, and the packet
is only retained once a second subscriber has actually shown up.

An undefined payload meant three different things: not yet encoded, failed and
should be retried, and serialized to undefined (which JSON of a value whose
toJSON returns undefined legitimately produces). The third case silently
degraded the cache to worse than no cache, re-serializing on every lookup.
Failure is now an explicit state rather than inferred from a value a
serializer can legitimately return.

The object-identity contract the whole design rests on was load-bearing but
undocumented, and only enforced by internal producers happening to allocate a
fresh object per version. It is now stated in server/DESIGN.md and pinned by a
test that asserts two subscribers of a record write receive the same value
object — the record path's identity comes from the store's read cache rather
than the audit record's memoized decode, which is the more fragile of the two
and had no coverage. Also adds tests for rotation, the reuse counter, and the
undefined-payload case, and qualifies getMessageSerializer's docstring: the
identity key is only valid because the built-in serializers are pure functions
of their argument, which a component registering into server.contentTypes
could violate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…g the fan-out with it

Round 3 of the independent pre-push review.

Retention was bounded in time but not in volume. Every object message's
payload is retained on the first delivery, before it is known whether a second
subscriber exists, so a single-subscriber topic at high throughput held an
entire rotation interval's worth of payloads live at once for no benefit —
a ceiling of throughput x size x 20s with nothing capping it. A byte budget
now rotates early once the retained bytes pass it, so the high-water mark is
fixed rather than proportional to load. The cost is that a fan-out spanning an
early rotation falls back to re-encoding: slower, never wrong.

fill() cleared the failure flag before serializing rather than after. On the
refill path the entry is already retained, so a synchronous throw would have
left it claiming success with no payload — and every later subscriber in the
retention window would have sent an empty PUBLISH rather than erroring. The
flag is now set pessimistically and cleared only once a payload is in hand,
which enforces "not failed implies a valid payload" instead of assuming it.

One transient serialization failure disconnected the entire fan-out. All
subscribers await the same promise, so a flaky blob read on a topic with 200
subscribers dropped all 200 sessions, where previously each serialized
independently and most would have succeeded. resolveSharedPayload retries once
through a fresh lookup: the first subscriber to arrive re-encodes and the rest
of the wave shares that attempt. Writing the test for this caught a real bug in
the first version of that retry — it rethrew for every subscriber after the
first, because it keyed off a failure flag a peer had already cleared.

Tests: the rotation timer's arm/stop/re-arm lifecycle (previously only the
rotation function was called directly, so nothing covered the state machine),
a concurrent wave recovering from one shared failure, and a failure that a
retry cannot fix still propagating.

Known and accepted: the hits > 0 gate that decides whether to retain a QoS 0
packet is payload-wide, not per (protocolVersion, topic), so a fan-out of
exactly two retains one packet nothing reads, and a mixed-protocol-version
topic can retain a packet for a cohort of one. Both are bounded by the
retention window and the byte budget; making the counter per-frame-key would
add a three-state frame lookup for no correctness gain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
test_export_terminology_test.json is written into the repo root by the export
integration test; it is not part of this change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…imate

Round 4 of the independent pre-push review found no majors. The remaining
substantive item was that the byte budget under-counted on three axes, so the
4 MB ceiling the comment claimed was really 4-8x that.

Strings were charged by character count while the default MQTT serializer is
JSONStringify, which returns a string — so the dominant path under-counted
about 2x. A second content type negotiated on an already-retained message was
linked into the entry and never charged at all. And promotion re-charged only
the payload, so a promoted entry's frames rode the second generation free.

Rather than patch each site, entries now carry what they hold: `bytes` is the
payload plus every frame, and `retained` says whether those bytes are charged
against the budget. Charge on the way in, give them back on refill, re-charge
the whole chain on promotion. That makes "charged if and only if retained" an
invariant the code states rather than an estimate three call sites have to
remember to keep in step — which is how all three holes got in.

Tests: byte pressure releasing earlier entries, and a refill giving its bytes
back (the budget had no coverage at all, which is why the holes shipped). The
unit suite's shareFrame helper claimed to mirror the outbound listener but
cached unconditionally, where the listener gates on hits > 0 — so the policy
that decides whether a QoS 0 packet is retained was asserted nowhere. It now
mirrors the real gate, and its test states the actual policy: nothing retained
for a fan-out of one, two generates for a fan-out of two, shared from the
third subscriber on.

Still accepted, unchanged from round 3: the hits > 0 gate is per encoding
while frames are keyed per (protocolVersion, topic), so a message delivered on
two topics can retain one frame nothing reads. Bounded by both the rotation
window and the byte budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…ented contract

Round 5 of the independent pre-push review. Its lead finding was that the
object-identity rule the sharing rests on had become a newly-imposed
constraint on a public API — a custom Resource that yields one mutable
envelope, mutates it, and re-sends would have every subscriber receive the
first message's bytes, silently, with byte-level tests passing. Documenting it
was the right instinct but the wrong mechanism for a footgun with no runtime
detection.

Sharing is now gated on provenance rather than on the app knowing the rule.
Store-sourced events carry a record version and are a fresh object per version
by construction; DurableSubscriptionsSession forwards that version to the
delivery listener, and the cache is only consulted when it is present. A
Resource yielding its own envelope has no version, falls back to today's
per-subscriber serialization, and can reuse a mutable object safely — it just
does not get the fan-out saving. Nothing user-visible regresses, and the
profiled workload is unaffected: the integration test proving one
serialization per publish still passes, which is what confirms the broker's
publish path carries a version end to end.

Also from round 5, all minor:

The retained/unretained boolean survived rotation, so a serialization
resolving after a rotation was charged to a budget it did not belong to and
charged again on promotion — forcing premature rotation under exactly the load
this targets. It is now an epoch stamped from the generation counter, so bytes
are charged if and only if they belong to the live generation.

setSharedFrame charged on every call including overwrites, so concurrent QoS 0
subscribers that each generated before any stored billed the budget N times
for one retained buffer. Only the buffer actually retained is charged now.

The retry swallowed the first serialization error entirely, so a transient
failure that recovered left no trace; it is logged at debug. The
MAX_RETAINED_BYTES comment now says it is a per-generation ceiling, so the
real steady-state bound is twice it. subscriptionValueIdentity.test.js uses
the shared unitTests/waitFor.js helper AGENTS.md mandates rather than a local
copy, and gained the other half of the identity contract: consecutive versions
of a record must be distinct objects.

Removing the listener signature's `as any` cast fell out of typing the
listener properly for the new argument.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
The export integration test writes test_export_terminology_test.json into the
repo root, so a git add -A after running the suite picks it up. Not part of
this change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…ssion to share

Round 6 of the independent pre-push review found that the provenance gate
added in round 5 was not provenance. `update.version` is whatever the
subscription iterator yielded, and a custom Resource controls it completely —
the obvious way to write one, wrapping a table subscription to enrich events,
copies the version straight through a spread. Such a producer reusing a
mutable envelope would still have been served the first publish's bytes, so
the gate rejected safe app producers while not actually stopping unsafe ones.
DESIGN.md claiming the contract was "enforced" was wrong.

The version is now part of the key rather than a boolean: an entry whose
version does not match is treated as a miss and the whole chain is re-encoded,
since every content type on it is equally stale. That makes reuse of a mutable
envelope with an advancing version correct rather than merely disallowed, and
leaves only same-object-and-same-version mutation — indistinguishable from
"the same message" by any definition. An event with no version at all is still
not shared: nothing then distinguishes one publish from the next.

The benchmark was measuring nothing. Round 5's gate made it fall through to
the unshared path on every iteration because it never passed a version, so the
only committed evidence for a performance change would have reported roughly
1.0x while the byte-equality assertion still passed. It now passes the version
exactly as the listener does — 1000 subscribers, QoS 0: 1.38 ms -> 0.031 ms
per publish.

Also: bytes landing after a rotation (a serialization resolving late, a frame
generated by a subscriber whose await spanned one) were charged to the entry
but skipped by the budget, so they were live and counted by no generation. The
entry's whole footprint is now folded into the live budget in that case,
counted exactly once.

Tests: the same object arriving with a new version re-encodes, a version
advance invalidates every content type on the chain, and a raw TCP subscriber
shares an encoding with a WebSocket subscriber negotiating JSON (their
serializer identities coincide, which nothing pinned). Two comments record
constraints a future change could silently break: the QoS 0 frame key does not
include dup/retain/properties because nothing varies them today, and the
integration serialization-count assertion is only meaningful because the
harness runs Harper single-threaded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
…rt artifact

Round 7 of the independent pre-push review returned no majors. Three items.

The retention epoch started at 0 while the "never retained" sentinel is -1, so
for the first rotation interval of a worker's life `UNRETAINED` aliased
`currentEpoch - 1` and charge() treated a never-retained entry as one still
live in the previous generation — folding its whole footprint into the budget.
The effective ceiling was about two thirds of what it claimed until the first
rotation. The epoch now starts at 1, which makes the sentinel unreachable.

A pass-through payload IS the message's own data, already reachable from the
WeakMap key, so charging the budget for it billed bytes that retention does
not add. It is no longer charged.

test_export_terminology_test.json had been added and removed three times on
this branch: the terminology integration test runs export_local with
`path: './'`, so the export lands in the repo root and any `git add -A` after
a test run commits it. Removing it a fourth time is the bandaid; the gitignore
entry alongside it only covered the northwind test's artifact, so the pattern
now covers both.

Tests: every accounting bug so far — a string charged by character count, a
chained content type never charged, a promotion charged twice, and now this
sentinel collision — passed tests that asserted only *that* a rotation
happened. getRetainedBytes() makes the numbers assertable, and a new test pins
them: a new entry charges its payload, a reuse does not re-charge, a chained
content type is charged, an overwritten frame is charged once, a version bump
gives the whole chain back, and a pass-through charges nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MmcGpXxJY2bNtWJQzZfSbw
Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com>
@kriszyp
kriszyp marked this pull request as draft August 4, 2026 12:29
@kriszyp
kriszyp force-pushed the perf/mqtt-shared-fanout-encoding branch from 088d470 to 782f142 Compare August 4, 2026 12:29
kriszyp and others added 4 commits August 4, 2026 07:39
Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: GPT-5 Codex <noreply@openai.com>
@kriszyp
kriszyp requested review from cb1kenobi and harper-joseph and removed request for dawsontoth and kylebernhardy August 4, 2026 15:34
@kriszyp
kriszyp marked this pull request as ready for review August 4, 2026 15:35
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