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fix(#1373): export Logger interface with error and warn methods - #1709

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dantebalor:fix/1373-logger-type-missing-error-warn
Oct 22, 2026
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Junirezz merged 1 commit into
Junirezz:mainfrom
dantebalor:fix/1373-logger-type-missing-error-warn

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closes #1373

  • Export a Logger interface (debug, info, warn, error) from middleware/structuredLogging.ts so modules can type injected loggers without coupling to the private implementation class.
  • Rename private class to LoggerImpl implements Logger to avoid the name collision; logger singleton typed as Logger.
  • Add src/alerting.ts: protocol-level alerting service that calls logger.error() for critical alerts and logger.warn() for warnings.
  • Add src/exposureGuardrails.ts: backend enforcement of protocol risk limits (TVL cap, concentration cap, deployed capital cap, stress-mode tightening) per docs/PROTOCOL_RISK_LIMITS.md, using logger.warn() on rejected checks.
  • Add 24-test suite alertingAndGuardrails.test.ts covering both modules including compile-time Logger interface checks.
  • Fix backend/jest.config.js: add moduleNameMapper for .prisma/client to unblock Jest resolution in pnpm workspaces.

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Changes

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For all smart contract code changes, complete the following checklist.

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Related Documentation


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✅ Ready for Review? Ensure all items above are checked before requesting review.

- Export a Logger interface (debug, info, warn, error) from
  middleware/structuredLogging.ts so modules can type injected
  loggers without coupling to the private implementation class.
- Rename private class to LoggerImpl implements Logger to avoid
  the name collision; logger singleton typed as Logger.
- Add src/alerting.ts: protocol-level alerting service that calls
  logger.error() for critical alerts and logger.warn() for warnings.
- Add src/exposureGuardrails.ts: backend enforcement of protocol
  risk limits (TVL cap, concentration cap, deployed capital cap,
  stress-mode tightening) per docs/PROTOCOL_RISK_LIMITS.md, using
  logger.warn() on rejected checks.
- Add 24-test suite alertingAndGuardrails.test.ts covering both
  modules including compile-time Logger interface checks.
- Fix backend/jest.config.js: add moduleNameMapper for .prisma/client
  to unblock Jest resolution in pnpm workspaces.
@Junirezz
Junirezz merged commit 9551a71 into Junirezz:main Oct 22, 2026
8 of 19 checks passed
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Logger type missing error and warn methods in alerting and guardrails modules

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