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fix(deps): bump certifi to 2026.10.23 (emSign CA removal) - #131
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Lock-only bump of
certifi2026.1.4 → 2026.10.23 for GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (certifi bundled emSign root CAs whose intermediate CA keys were compromised; fixed in 2026.10.18).Exposure
certifi is a runtime dependency, pulled in by
requests, and it is the trust store for every HTTPS call the CLI makes (hf://and URL scans,--share, the version check, OSV lookups). It ships to pip users and is bundled into the standalone binary (certifi/cacert.pem). Before this change, a certificate issued under one of the affected emSign intermediates would have been trusted on those connections.What changes for users
The CA bundle drops from 136 to 118 roots: the affected emSign roots (
emSign ECC Root CA - G3,emSign Root CA - C1,emSign ECC Root CA - C3), plus Mozilla's routine removals since January. Upstream keepsemSign Root CA - G1. A host that chains only to a removed root will now fail TLS verification. That is the intended effect, so I checked every host the CLI contacts against the new bundle: aisbom.io, api.aisbom.io, app.aisbom.io, api.osv.dev, huggingface.co (including the redirect to its file CDN), pypi.org and github.com all verify.Verification (on top of current
main)poetry check --lock: OK. The lock diff touches only certifi (4 lines); no header,content-hashorlock-versionchurn.pytest --cov=aisbom --cov-fail-under=85: 1553 passed, coverage 93.83%.main; harness proven deterministic first.hf://google-bert/bert-base-uncased: exits 0 from source and from the rebuilt binary, with identical reports.scripts/build_binaries.sh(macOS arm64): build check passes, and the newcertifi/cacert.pemis bundled.