Skip to content
Merged
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
17 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
4512acc
fix(release): make --require-signatures verify, not just find a .sig
r0x0r Oct 5, 2026
e711b37
fix(release): resolve the signing key from the path variable too
r0x0r Oct 6, 2026
b1efe5b
fix(release): pin the verify gate with a self-test that can fail
r0x0r Oct 6, 2026
b4c9b9a
fix(release): pin the verify wiring, not just the decision
r0x0r Oct 6, 2026
c654885
test(release): pin main's use of the verify gate, not just the gate
r0x0r Oct 7, 2026
90a664b
test(release): pin that main verifies, not just that it refuses
r0x0r Oct 7, 2026
a9ec22a
docs(release): record the verification trigger that was removed
r0x0r Oct 7, 2026
3738f70
test(release): pin which key verification uses, and that the log name…
r0x0r Oct 7, 2026
e02aacf
fix(xtask): cross-check a path-supplied CI signing key too
r0x0r Oct 7, 2026
2531243
test(release): drive main on the paths the gate's own promises live on
r0x0r Oct 8, 2026
ae29152
fix(xtask): treat a named-but-empty CI key as an error, and pin the e…
r0x0r Oct 8, 2026
173c521
fix(xtask): resolve a blank key path like the gate, and test that run…
r0x0r Oct 9, 2026
39eeceb
test(release): pin that a configured PEM alone no longer verifies
r0x0r Oct 9, 2026
ed61c3a
docs(release): cite the workflow steps by name, not by line number
r0x0r Oct 13, 2026
5cc96a6
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/rocmai-443-signat…
r0x0r Oct 13, 2026
39d1321
test(xtask): pin the path-before-PEM key order across both gates
r0x0r Oct 13, 2026
4230342
refactor(release): reuse the signing-key env constants in the trust c…
r0x0r Oct 13, 2026
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
48 changes: 42 additions & 6 deletions docs/release-trust.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -47,12 +47,48 @@ python scripts/release_readiness.py \
```

The verifier confirms each named archive has the required rocm-cli bundle
files, confirms the `.sha256` sidecar matches the archive bytes and names the
archive being published, and confirms a non-empty `.sig` sidecar exists when
signatures are required. If a public key is provided with `--public-key`, it
also verifies the detached signature with `openssl`. Release CI also enables
`--require-rocm-asset-names`, which rejects branch-like, path-like, or
otherwise unsupported archive names before upload.
files, and confirms the `.sha256` sidecar matches the archive bytes and names
the archive being published.

`--require-signatures` requires signatures that *verify*, not merely exist: each
archive must have a non-empty `.sig` sidecar, and that signature must check out
against the release signing public key via `cargo xtask verify`. The key is
taken from `--public-key` when given, then from the key file named by
`ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`, then from the inline
`ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM` that release and nightly CI wire from the
signing-key secret — the same path-before-PEM precedence `install.sh` applies to
the public key, and `cargo xtask package` to the private one. If none resolves,
the gate fails. It deliberately does
not fall back to checking that a `.sig` file is present: a sidecar produced by
the wrong key, truncated, or corrupted would pass such a check, and because an
unset GitHub secret expands to the empty string, the fallback would be reached
silently whenever the secret was removed or rotated away. The log line
`signature verification key:` names the key the run actually used, and is
printed as soon as the key resolves so that a run which then fails verification
still records which trust root it used.

Verification is driven by what the run asks for, not by what happens to be in
the environment: `--require-signatures`, `--require-production-trust` or an
explicit `--public-key` — or the environment equivalents of the first two,
`ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE` and `ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST`. The
bundle-packaging steps set `ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1` on the step that runs
the gate — "Package release bundle" and "Package Windows bundle" in
[`release.yml`](../.github/workflows/release.yml), "Package nightly bundle" and
"Package Windows bundle" in [`nightly.yml`](../.github/workflows/nightly.yml) —
while production trust is set once at workflow level, from the
`ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_PRODUCTION_TRUST` repository variable in each file's top-level
`env:` block. Note that exporting `ROCM_CLI_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE=1` for
packaging therefore also requires a resolvable signing key, where before it
needed only a `.sig`.
Previously a key present in
`ROCM_CLI_SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM` was enough to opportunistically verify even
without those flags; that trigger was removed when the flags began to imply
verification, so a readiness run that asks for neither now checks neither
signature presence nor validity. Every `release.yml` and `nightly.yml`
invocation passes `--require-signatures`, so no workflow takes that path.

Release CI also enables `--require-rocm-asset-names`, which rejects branch-like,
path-like, or otherwise unsupported archive names before upload.

Release CI also enables `--require-exact-assets`. That rejects stale
publishable files in `dist`, including old `.tar.gz`/`.zip` archives and orphan
Expand Down
Loading
Loading