🔒 Prevent path traversal in process commands - #198
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Added validation to prevent path traversal (`..`) and null bytes (`\0`) in command execution via `std.process.run` and `std.process.spawn`. This ensures that even when the Process capability is granted, the engine mitigates attempts to execute arbitrary binaries outside of intended directories. Co-authored-by: Tcode-Motion <188012755+Tcode-Motion@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: Added validation to prevent path traversal (
⚠️ Risk: Arbitrary command execution could be leveraged using path traversal sequences to execute unauthorized binaries outside intended directories, even if the
..) and null bytes (\0) in command execution viastd.process.runandstd.process.spawn.Processcapability is restricted to specific paths.🛡️ Solution: Implemented checks in both
runandspawncallbacks to explicitly reject commands containing..or\0, ensuring only safe, direct commands or explicit absolute paths (without traversal) can be executed.PR created automatically by Jules for task 3065281696807958351 started by @Tcode-Motion