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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions cloudformation/devops-agent-skill-policies/README.md
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Expand Up @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ Each parameter is `'true'` / `'false'` and defaults to `'true'`. Set a skill to
| `EnableSageMakerAIOpsReview` | `sagemaker-ai-ops-review` | `savingsplans:DescribeSavingsPlans` |
| `EnableLiveStreamingEventReadinessReview` | `live-streaming-event-readiness-review` | `mediatailor:ListPlaybackConfigurations`, `mediatailor:GetPlaybackConfiguration`, `mediatailor:ListPrefetchSchedules`, `route53-recovery-cluster:ListRoutingControls` |
| `EnableEosCostAnalysis` | `eos-cost-analysis` | `pricing:GetProducts`, `pricing:GetAttributeValues`, `pricing:DescribeServices`. Resource discovery is already covered by the managed policy |
| `EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation` | `aws-security-finding-investigation` | `iam:ListAccessKeys`, `iam:GetAccessKeyLastUsed`, `iam:ListAttachedUserPolicies`, `iam:ListUserPolicies`, `iam:ListGroupsForUser` (users in this account), `iam:ListAttachedGroupPolicies`, `iam:ListGroupPolicies` (groups in this account), `iam:GetAccountSummary`, `config:GetResourceConfigHistory`, `config:GetComplianceDetailsByResource`, `config:GetComplianceDetailsByConfigRule`, `s3:GetBucketPolicyStatus`, `s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock` |
| `EnableEksOperationReview` | `aws-eks-operations-review` | None — already covered by the managed policy |
| `EnableEnrichWithSecurityAgent` | `enrich-with-aws-security-agent` | None — already covered by the managed policy |
| `EnableCrmInvestigationGuidelines` | `crm-production-investigation-guidelines` | None — already covered by the managed policy |
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Expand Up @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ Metadata:
- EnableSageMakerAIOpsReview
- EnableAwsFsxnOperationsReview
- EnableEosCostAnalysis
- EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation
- Label:
default: Optional Resource Scoping
Parameters:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -202,6 +203,17 @@ Parameters:
AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
Default: 'true'

EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation:
Type: String
Description: >
AWS Security Finding Investigation skill (read-only: adds the reads that
AIDevOpsAgentAccessPolicy does not grant: an IAM user's access keys and their last
use, groups and policies; group policies; the account summary; AWS Config
resource history and compliance details; and the bucket policy status and account-level
Block Public Access settings).
AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
Default: 'true'

Conditions:
CreateNewRole: !Equals [!Ref ExistingRoleName, '']
SkillAwsHealthEvents: !Equals [!Ref EnableAwsHealthEvents, 'true']
Expand All @@ -219,6 +231,7 @@ Conditions:
SkillAwsFsxnOperationsReview: !Equals [!Ref EnableAwsFsxnOperationsReview, 'true']
SkillLiveStreamingEventReadinessReview: !Equals [!Ref EnableLiveStreamingEventReadinessReview, 'true']
SkillEosCostAnalysis: !Equals [!Ref EnableEosCostAnalysis, 'true']
SkillAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation: !Equals [!Ref EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation, 'true']
ConfigAthenaCiAnalysis: !Equals [!Ref EnableConfigAthenaCiAnalysis, 'true']
HasConfigDataBucketArn: !Not [!Equals [!Ref ConfigDataBucketArn, '']]
HasRegionRestriction: !Not [!Equals [!Join ['', !Ref AllowedRegions], '']]
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -726,6 +739,57 @@ Resources:
- route53-recovery-cluster:ListRoutingControls
Resource: '*'

# aws-security-finding-investigation: read-only. Adds only the reads that
# AIDevOpsAgentAccessPolicy (v15, checked 2026-11-12) does not grant. Everything else the
# skill reads -- GuardDuty and Security Hub findings, CloudTrail management events and trail
# settings (LookupEvents, DescribeTrails, GetTrailStatus, GetEventSelectors), Logs Insights, EC2/VPC describes, S3 bucket
# policy/ACL/bucket Block Public Access, Config recorder status, IAM roles -- is covered by the
# managed policy. Without this policy the skill uses CloudTrail events for the same facts
# and reports what it could not read as Unknown.
PolicyAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation:
Type: AWS::IAM::Policy
Condition: SkillAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation
Properties:
PolicyName: DevOpsAgentSkill-AwsSecurityFindingInvestigation
Roles:
- !If [CreateNewRole, !Ref DevOpsAgentRole, !Ref ExistingRoleName]
PolicyDocument:
Version: '2012-10-17'
Statement:
- Sid: SecurityFindingIamUserReads
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:ListAccessKeys
- iam:GetAccessKeyLastUsed
- iam:ListAttachedUserPolicies
- iam:ListUserPolicies
- iam:ListGroupsForUser
Resource: !Sub 'arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:user/*'
- Sid: SecurityFindingIamGroupReads
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:ListAttachedGroupPolicies
- iam:ListGroupPolicies
Resource: !Sub 'arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:group/*'
- Sid: SecurityFindingIamAccountSummary
Effect: Allow
Action:
- iam:GetAccountSummary
Resource: '*'
- Sid: SecurityFindingConfigHistory
Effect: Allow
Action:
- config:GetResourceConfigHistory
- config:GetComplianceDetailsByResource
- config:GetComplianceDetailsByConfigRule
Resource: '*'
- Sid: SecurityFindingPublicAccessStatus
Effect: Allow
Action:
- s3:GetBucketPolicyStatus
- s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock
Resource: '*'

Outputs:
DevOpsAgentRoleArn:
Description: Role ARN to use with aws devops-agent associate-service.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -758,6 +822,7 @@ Outputs:
- aws-fsxn-operations-review: ${EnableAwsFsxnOperationsReview} (fsx:Describe*/ListTagsForResource, cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms/GetMetricData/GetMetricStatistics/ListMetrics, backup:ListProtectedResources/ListRecoveryPointsByResource, ec2:DescribeSecurityGroups/NetworkInterfaces/Subnets/RouteTables)
- live-streaming-event-readiness-review: ${EnableLiveStreamingEventReadinessReview} (mediatailor:ListPlaybackConfigurations/GetPlaybackConfiguration/ListPrefetchSchedules, route53-recovery-cluster:ListRoutingControls)
- eos-cost-analysis: ${EnableEosCostAnalysis} (pricing:GetProducts/GetAttributeValues/DescribeServices — resource discovery is covered by the managed policy)
- aws-security-finding-investigation: ${EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation} (iam:ListAccessKeys/GetAccessKeyLastUsed/ListAttachedUserPolicies/ListUserPolicies/ListGroupsForUser/ListAttachedGroupPolicies/ListGroupPolicies/GetAccountSummary, config:GetResourceConfigHistory/GetComplianceDetailsByResource/GetComplianceDetailsByConfigRule, s3:GetBucketPolicyStatus/GetAccountPublicAccessBlock)
Skills covered by AIDevOpsAgentAccessPolicy (no extra policy needed):
- aws-eks-operations-review, eks-upgrade-readiness, enrich-with-aws-security-agent, crm-production-investigation-guidelines
- cloudtrail-cost-optimization, config-cost-optimization, guardduty-cost-optimization (ce:Get* and s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration already granted on * by the managed policy)
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions llms.txt
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Expand Up @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ The full set of values is in .github/scripts/skill-rules/agent-types.json. The D
- [VPC DNS Investigation Skill](skills/aws-vpc-dns-investigation/SKILL.md): Diagnoses VPC DNS resolution failures and validates DNS control-plane changes before they are applied, driving the aws-vpc-dns-diagnostics MCP server to observe live resolution from inside the affected subnet and to simulate a proposed change
- [AWS Routing Skill](skills/aws-routing/SKILL.md): Read-only analysis and troubleshooting of AWS routing and BGP path selection across Cloud WAN, Direct Connect, Transit Gateway, VPC, and VPN — traces the end-to-end path, applies each construct's route-evaluation order, engineers traffic with local-preference communities and AS-path, flags non-deterministic selection, and produces describe/get/list validation commands grounded in public AWS documentation
- [Network Log Analyzer Skill](skills/network-log-analyzer/SKILL.md): Read-only troubleshooting of AWS network connectivity from VPC Flow Logs and packet captures (tcpdump, Wireshark, tshark text output) — attributes REJECTs to security groups or network ACLs, analyzes TCP handshakes, resets, retransmissions, path MTU and idle timeouts, finds the real source behind NAT gateways and EKS pods, and produces Logs Insights/Athena queries and describe/get/list validation commands
- [AWS Security Finding Investigation Skill](skills/aws-security-finding-investigation/SKILL.md): Read-only investigation of GuardDuty and Security Hub findings, CloudTrail-based alarms and AWS Config rule changes — who acted, what changed, what is exposed and whether it was used, with coverage checks (missing logs are Unknown), a Benign / At risk or compromised / Unmonitored verdict, and preserve, contain, eradicate and recover commands for a person to run
- [Bedrock Adoption Readiness Skill](skills/bedrock-adoption-readiness/SKILL.md): Assesses an AWS account's readiness to run Amazon Bedrock at production scale across IAM governance, data retention (ZDR), quota and capacity headroom, and operational observability, covering both the standard Bedrock and bedrock-mantle (OpenAI-compatible) surfaces with multi-region discovery
- [Analytics OpenSearch Expertise Skill](skills/analytics-opensearch-expertise/SKILL.md): Performs read-only health assessments of Amazon OpenSearch Service domains through 24 deterministic checks across cluster health, storage and shards, performance, security, and cost optimization, producing a structured findings report with prioritized remediation guidance
- [Honeycomb Production Investigation Skill](skills/honeycomb-production-investigation/SKILL.md): Investigates latency spikes, error surges, deployment regressions and dependency failures through the Honeycomb MCP server, chaining a broad query, BubbleUp, trace drill-down and a verification query to a root cause
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3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions skills/aws-security-finding-investigation/.skilleval.yaml
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
audit:
ignore:
- STR-016 # README alongside SKILL.md is intentional
80 changes: 80 additions & 0 deletions skills/aws-security-finding-investigation/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# Changelog

## [1.0.0] - 2026-11-09

### Added

- Initial release: read-only investigation of AWS security findings from GuardDuty, Security
Hub, CloudTrail-based alarms, and AWS Config rules.
- Six-step workflow following the detect, analyze, contain, eradicate and recover phases of the
AWS Security Incident Response Guide and NIST SP 800-61:
triage, investigate, determine, then recommended containment, eradication and recovery, and a
report with a self-check.
- Seven investigation modes with signals, evidence to collect, and common misreadings:
credential misuse, root activity, privilege escalation and persistence, defense evasion,
exposure changes, data access, and compute compromise or destructive activity.
- Suggested P1 to P4 triage criteria adapted from the AWS incident response playbook samples,
with the inputs a person confirms (business impact, data sensitivity).
- Read-only CloudTrail, S3 data event, AWS Config, and VPC Flow Logs queries, with coverage
checks before results are read.
- Response catalog with exact AWS CLI commands, impact, undo, and approver for each action;
evidence preservation always comes first and no command is run by the agent.
- Output by agent type: a report for chat, and the investigation's root cause, key findings,
gaps and evidence sections for Incident RCA.
- Fallbacks when a read is denied: the CloudTrail event for the same fact, reported as such.
Extra read permissions in the skill policies template (`EnableAwsSecurityFindingInvestigation`).
- CloudTrail management events through `lookup_cloudtrail_events`, with an error-handling table
that separates runtime refusals from IAM gaps.
- S3 object reads counted only from data events delivered to CloudWatch Logs; otherwise Unknown.
- GuardDuty brute-force `ResourceRole` and the AWS compromised-key quarantine policy.
- Persistence and root rows of the triage table are this skill's own judgement; the rest follows
the AWS incident response playbook samples.
- Containment for IAM Identity Center permission set roles (`AWSReservedSSO_*`), which IAM
can't edit: a deny on `identitystore:userId`, removed assignments, ended sessions.
- `StartLogging` (and CloudTrail Lake ingestion events) in the logging checks, so a restarted
trail closes the gap instead of leaving it open-ended.
- Evaluations in two kinds: chat questions about pasted records, and questions about real
resources in the account (including a second Region); trigger queries include neighbouring
skills that should not trigger.

### Changed before submission

- After the subject-matter expert review: session revocation is written after the source credential
is cut off, uses a time about 30 seconds after now, and the deny is kept at least 36 hours for a
user and for the role's `MaxSessionDuration` for a role; chained roles and roles in other accounts
are revoked in the account that owns them; root temporary credentials are not limited by policy;
flow log and data event coverage checks read the traffic type and the read/write type; more
eradication rows (group membership, existing role and group policies, SAML providers, MFA
devices, shared snapshots and images) and defense evasion events; a write command, the
management account and identity source order for IAM Identity Center; and a verify step that
checks the revoked sessions.
- Response commands come from `references/response-actions.md`. A command for an action the file
does not list is labelled as not from the skill's command list, to check before running it.
- `ConsoleLogin` Regions follow the sign-in endpoint: root in us-east-1, us-east-2 or us-west-2; IAM user
through the global endpoint in us-east-1, or in us-east-2, eu-north-1 or ap-southeast-2 with an
account alias cookie; Regional endpoint in its own Region. Query a multi-Region trail once, or each
Region, and name the Regions checked.
- The CloudTrail path depends on where the agent runs: in investigations (and their subagents)
`use_aws` refuses CloudTrail operations, so events come from `lookup_cloudtrail_events` and trail
settings from AWS Config and the logging events; in chat, `use_aws` CloudTrail calls work.
Tests on 2026-11-08 and 2026-11-09 saw both behaviours. A refused call whose fact a fallback
supplied is no longer listed as a gap.
- Security group connection tracking: untracked flows are TCP or UDP only, and connections
through NAT gateways, Network Load Balancers, Global Accelerator and interface endpoints are
always tracked.
- Reputation lookups send only public IP addresses and domains to a tool the organization
approved, never account IDs, ARNs, key IDs or internal names.
- AWS Config history of a trail: `supplementaryConfiguration.isLogging` as of that item; the
event selectors themselves are not in it.
- Cases that asked "according to the skill" were rewritten as scenarios, so a run without the
skill can answer them too.
- The description asks the agent to load the skill for pasted records too, and names the
questions users ask about containment and evidence counts, because chat runs often answered
without loading it. It also names S3 object-read questions, "did anyone get in?" and
SSHBruteForce, which chat runs answered without the skill.
- Every investigation finding starts with its state and suggested priority, because the
investigation summary is built from the recorded findings and runs that kept the priority in
their notes lost it. An exposure with no evidence of use still gets a state and a priority.
- A "can we close it?" answer lists the three Benign conditions: the approval source, the logs
that must have been recording, and nothing else unusual. A note claiming approval is called a
suspicious artifact.
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