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Security: bronto-community/bronto-sdk-python

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

bronto-sdk is pre-1.0. Security fixes are released against the latest published version only; there are no long-term support branches. Pin a released version and upgrade forward rather than backporting.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.

Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, which opens a draft advisory visible only to the maintainers. If you cannot use that, email security@bronto.io.

Please include:

  • the version of bronto-sdk and of Python you tested against,
  • what an attacker gains, in one sentence,
  • the smallest reproduction you have — a failing script is ideal,
  • any suggested fix, if you have one.

What to expect

Stage Target
Acknowledgement of your report 3 working days
Initial assessment, with a severity 10 working days
Fix released, or a dated plan if it needs longer 90 days

We will keep you updated as the assessment progresses, credit you in the advisory and the changelog unless you prefer otherwise, and coordinate the disclosure timing with you. We do not operate a paid bounty.

Scope

In scope: anything in this repository — the client, the domain helpers, the models, the MCP endpoint registry, and the release and build tooling under .github/ and scripts/.

Out of scope: vulnerabilities in the Bronto platform or its HTTP API rather than in this client (report those to security@bronto.io directly), and findings in third-party dependencies with no exploitable path through this SDK — please report those upstream, though we welcome a heads-up.

Credential handling

This SDK holds API keys and bearer tokens, so reports in that area are particularly welcome. By design a credential must never reach an exception message, a repr(), or a log line, and a client is either client-bound or per-request with no fallback between the two. A case where a credential leaks into any of those, or where the two credential modes mix, is a vulnerability even without a further exploit.

Verifying a release

Every release is published two ways, both by the release.yml workflow from the tagged commit; no artifact is uploaded by hand:

Both are the same bytes: PyPI receives exactly the files that were signed and attached to the GitHub Release, not a second build. Both proofs are keyless — there is no signing key, and this repository stores no secrets — and both say the same thing: the file was produced by this repository's release workflow, running on the tag it claims.

From PyPI

PyPI shows the attestation under "Provenance" on each file's page. To check it yourself:

pip install pypi-attestations

pypi-attestations verify pypi \
  --repository https://github.com/bronto-community/bronto-sdk-python \
  pypi:bronto_sdk-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl

From a GitHub Release

Every release carries a .sigstore.json bundle beside each artifact. The verifier is a Python package, so checking a download needs nothing but pip:

pip install sigstore

# Download the artifact and its bundle from the release, side by side, then:
python -m sigstore verify identity \
  --cert-identity https://github.com/bronto-community/bronto-sdk-python/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.2.1 \
  --cert-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  bronto_sdk-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl

Two things to watch. The .sigstore.json bundle must sit in the same directory as the artifact being verified — that is how the verifier finds it. And --cert-identity ends in the tag, so it changes with every release: verifying another version means changing refs/tags/v0.2.1 in that URL as well as the file name.

A signature or attestation that does not verify means the file is not what this project published. Treat it as a security report and use the private reporting channel above rather than opening an issue.

There aren't any published security advisories