bronto-sdk is pre-1.0. Security fixes are released against the latest
published version only; there are no long-term support branches. Pin a released
version and upgrade forward rather than backporting.
Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.
Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, which opens a draft advisory visible only to the maintainers. If you cannot use that, email security@bronto.io.
Please include:
- the version of
bronto-sdkand of Python you tested against, - what an attacker gains, in one sentence,
- the smallest reproduction you have — a failing script is ideal,
- any suggested fix, if you have one.
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement of your report | 3 working days |
| Initial assessment, with a severity | 10 working days |
| Fix released, or a dated plan if it needs longer | 90 days |
We will keep you updated as the assessment progresses, credit you in the advisory and the changelog unless you prefer otherwise, and coordinate the disclosure timing with you. We do not operate a paid bounty.
In scope: anything in this repository — the client, the domain helpers, the
models, the MCP endpoint registry, and the release and build tooling under
.github/ and scripts/.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in the Bronto platform or its HTTP API rather than in this client (report those to security@bronto.io directly), and findings in third-party dependencies with no exploitable path through this SDK — please report those upstream, though we welcome a heads-up.
This SDK holds API keys and bearer tokens, so reports in that area are
particularly welcome. By design a credential must never reach an exception
message, a repr(), or a log line, and a client is either client-bound or
per-request with no fallback between the two. A case where a credential leaks
into any of those, or where the two credential modes mix, is a vulnerability
even without a further exploit.
Every release is published two ways, both by the release.yml workflow from
the tagged commit; no artifact is uploaded by hand:
- to PyPI (from v0.2.1), through Trusted Publishing — there is no PyPI token anywhere — with a PEP 740 attestation for each file;
- to a GitHub Release, with a Sigstore signature for each file (from v0.1.2).
Both are the same bytes: PyPI receives exactly the files that were signed and attached to the GitHub Release, not a second build. Both proofs are keyless — there is no signing key, and this repository stores no secrets — and both say the same thing: the file was produced by this repository's release workflow, running on the tag it claims.
PyPI shows the attestation under "Provenance" on each file's page. To check it yourself:
pip install pypi-attestations
pypi-attestations verify pypi \
--repository https://github.com/bronto-community/bronto-sdk-python \
pypi:bronto_sdk-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whlEvery release carries a .sigstore.json bundle beside each artifact. The
verifier is a Python package, so checking a download needs nothing but pip:
pip install sigstore
# Download the artifact and its bundle from the release, side by side, then:
python -m sigstore verify identity \
--cert-identity https://github.com/bronto-community/bronto-sdk-python/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.2.1 \
--cert-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
bronto_sdk-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whlTwo things to watch. The .sigstore.json bundle must sit in the same directory
as the artifact being verified — that is how the verifier finds it. And
--cert-identity ends in the tag, so it changes with every release: verifying
another version means changing refs/tags/v0.2.1 in that URL as well as the
file name.
A signature or attestation that does not verify means the file is not what this project published. Treat it as a security report and use the private reporting channel above rather than opening an issue.