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Security: bronto-community/compy

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately via GitHub's security advisory flow: Report a vulnerability. Do not open a public issue for security reports.

You can expect an initial response within a few business days. Please include a description, reproduction steps, and the affected version (compy version).

Supported versions

Only the latest release receives security fixes. Update with brew upgrade compy or from the releases page.

Version Supported
latest release yes
older releases no

Verifying releases

Release checksums are signed with cosign (keyless); verifying the one signature transitively verifies every archive via its checksum:

cosign verify-blob \
  --certificate checksums.txt.pem \
  --signature checksums.txt.sig \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'github.com/bronto-community/compy' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  checksums.txt
shasum -a 256 --check --ignore-missing checksums.txt

Release archives also carry signed SLSA build provenance. Verify that an artifact was built by this repo's release workflow with:

gh attestation verify compy_<version>_<os>_<arch>.tar.gz --repo bronto-community/compy

SPDX SBOMs for every archive are attached to each release.

Release binaries are not yet Developer ID-signed or notarized; the Homebrew cask clears macOS's quarantine flag on install, a manually downloaded archive needs xattr -d com.apple.quarantine (after verifying its checksum and signature).

Scope notes

  • The web UI and REST API bind to localhost only; there is no daemon and nothing listens on external interfaces. The shipped collector configurations bind their OTLP receivers to 127.0.0.1 as well.
  • Downloaded collector distributions are pinned: a shipped version is verified against a compiled-in sha256, a pulled update against the .sha256 asset published in the same upstream release.
  • Preset values (API keys included) are stored in compy's state directory (~/Library/Application Support/compy) and travel only into the local collector's process environment — compy itself sends them nowhere. Keychain-backed secret storage is a known non-goal for now.
  • Dependencies are watched by Dependabot, and govulncheck runs on every PR plus a weekly sweep.

There aren't any published security advisories