Skip to content

Security: maxdraki/trug

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Trug is a self-hosted app that people put on the open internet (behind a Cloudflare Tunnel, a Tailscale node, or Railway), and it holds real credentials — passkeys, session cookies, and encrypted-at-rest LLM API keys. So security reports genuinely matter here, even for a small household project. Thank you for looking.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please don't open a public GitHub issue for a security problem. A public issue tells everyone about the hole before self-hosters have had a chance to update.

Instead, email max@illis.co.uk with the details. Helpful things to include:

  • what the issue is and roughly how bad you think it is,
  • steps (or a small proof of concept) to reproduce it,
  • which part of Trug it touches, if you know.

If you'd like to send it encrypted, just say so in a first plain email — no need to put anything sensitive in it — and we'll sort out a channel (e.g. a PGP key or another route) before you send the real report.

What to expect

Trug is maintained by one person in their spare time, so this is best-effort, not a funded program — no bug bounty, no SLA. That said:

  • I'll aim to acknowledge your report within about a week.
  • I'll let you know whether I can reproduce it and what I plan to do.
  • Once there's a fix, I'm happy to credit you if you'd like (or keep you anonymous — your call).

Please give a reasonable amount of time for a fix to ship before disclosing publicly.

Where the risk lives

If you're poking at Trug, these are the security-sensitive surfaces most worth your attention:

  • Passkey / WebAuthn auth (py_webauthn) — registration and login ceremonies, the bootstrap-token first-user claim, and single-use invite links.
  • The embedded OAuth 2.1 authorization server — Trug is its own authorization server for MCP clients (client ID metadata / CIMD, PKCE, the consent screen and token endpoints).
  • Bearer / machine tokens — the ring and token-based MCP clients authenticate with static bearer tokens (/api/capture, /mcp), which are deliberately more limited than a human passkey session.
  • Encryption at rest — BYOK LLM keys are encrypted with Fernet (TRUG_SECRET) when stored in SQLite. Key handling, masking, and making sure keys never leak into logs or the fetch-models response is in scope.
  • Session handling — session cookies, revocation, and the boundary that keeps bearer/machine sessions out of the human-only Settings areas.

Config and deployment mistakes (a mismatched TRUG_RP_ID/TRUG_ORIGIN, a plaintext key because TRUG_SECRET is unset on a shared DB) are documented in the README rather than being bugs — but if you find a case where Trug makes the safe path hard or fails silently in a dangerous way, that's worth reporting too.

Supported versions

This is a single-branch project. Security fixes land on main and in the latest release only. There's no back-porting to older tags — if you're self-hosting, track the latest.

There aren't any published security advisories