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Security: mentatalbans/hyperclaw

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a vulnerability

Open a GitHub issue with the label security, or email the maintainer privately for sensitive reports. Do not include exploit details in public issues.

Threat model: your assistant answers DMs

HyperClaw connects LLM tool execution (shell, files, email) to chat channels. The single most important configuration decision is who is allowed to talk to it. A stranger who can message your bot can potentially read your files and send email as you.

What happens when a stranger messages the bot

  • Telegram: messages from any chat id other than TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID are ignored. Keep the bot username unlisted and never post it publicly; Telegram bots are discoverable by name and WILL receive spam probes.
  • iMessage: senders not in IMESSAGE_ALLOWED_CONTACTS are ignored. The allowlist is empty by default = deny everyone. Add only your own numbers/emails.

Recommended settings

  1. TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID — set to your own chat id only. Group chats are not recommended: anyone added to the group inherits full tool access.
  2. IMESSAGE_ALLOWED_CONTACTS — your numbers only, in every format iMessage may report them (+15551234567,5551234567).
  3. Run the gateway on a machine you control; do not expose the HTTP server (PORT) to the internet without authentication in front of it.
  4. HEARTBEAT_URL is a secret — anyone holding it can fake your machine's liveness.
  5. Rotate any credential that ever lands in a chat transcript or log file.

Secrets hygiene

  • All credentials live in .env (gitignored). .env.example documents every variable.
  • Bot tokens appear in httpx request-URL log lines at INFO level; keep logs/ private and rotate the token if logs are ever shared.
  • The pre-push hook in this repo runs a secret scan before anything reaches a public remote. Keep it installed.

There aren't any published security advisories