Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately using GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" flow (repository → Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability). Do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Please include: what you observed, how to reproduce it, and the affected version/commit. We aim to acknowledge within a few days. This is a volunteer-maintained hobbyist project, so please set expectations accordingly; there is no bounty.
The project follows Semantic Versioning. While it is
pre-1.0 (0.y.z), only the latest released 0.y line receives fixes.
jornada-link connects a modern Mac to a vintage Windows CE 2.x handheld over
a point-to-point serial cable carrying PPP. The trust boundary is small and
local:
- The transport is a physical cable, not a shared network. The realistic adversaries are (a) other hosts on any LAN/Wi-Fi the Mac is also attached to, who might reach the local listener; (b) a malicious or malfunctioning device / RAPI implementation on the far end of the cable feeding malformed frames; and (c) local unprivileged processes on the Mac racing the root helper.
- The tool requires administrator rights only to run
pppd(which creates the network interface). Everything else runs as the normal user. - The vintage protocols themselves offer no transport encryption or strong authentication — only an XOR-obfuscated device password. This is inherent to 1990s Windows CE and cannot be fixed from this side. Do not treat the link as confidential; treat the handheld as a trusted peer on a private cable.
| Category | How it is addressed |
|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control | The dccm listener (TCP 5679) accepts connections only from the device's PPP peer IP (192.168.131.201). It binds 0.0.0.0 because the PPP interface may not exist when it starts, so access is enforced by a peer allowlist, not the bind address. |
| A02 Security Misconfiguration | No services are exposed beyond the peer-filtered dccm port. pppd is invoked with an explicit, minimal option set (noauth local nodefaultroute, dead-peer detection). The root helper touches only ~/.jornada-link and system binaries. |
| A03 Software Supply Chain | Zero third-party runtime dependencies. The Python package uses only the standard library; the Swift package uses only Apple frameworks. CI actions are pinned by commit SHA. |
| A04 Cryptographic Failures | The link is explicitly not treated as confidential (see threat model). The device password is sent using the only scheme CE understands (UTF‑16 XOR); it is never written to logs or state files. The backup manifest uses MD5 as a non-security change-detection checksum, not an integrity control. |
| A05 Injection | The serial device path is validated (/dev/cu.*, no shell metacharacters) before it reaches the root pppd command, since it may come from a user-writable pin file; jornada usb pin and the app's USB pane apply the same rule when writing that file. Device-supplied file names are neutralized before use as local paths. The USB doctor runs only /usr/sbin/ioreg with fixed arguments and parses its plist output; nothing read from the registry is ever executed. |
| A06 Vulnerable & Outdated Components | Nothing to update — no dependency tree. Toolchain versions are documented in CI. |
| A07 Identification & Authentication | Optional device password is supported end-to-end; failures are reported, not silently ignored. The listener will not proceed past a rejected password. |
| A08 Software & Data Integrity | The tool does not download or execute remote code. Users supply their own .cab/app files; those are copied verbatim to the device and run by the device's own installer at the user's explicit request. |
| A09 Logging & Alerting | App and dccm events are logged to ~/.jornada-link/*.log; passwords are never logged. Rejected peers and password failures are logged. Raw PPP recordings (ppp.record) stay local and are git-ignored. |
| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | RAPI reply frames are capped (16 MB) so a hostile/buggy peer cannot drive unbounded allocation. Socket reads have timeouts; a wedged link fails fast with a clear message instead of hanging. Backup continues past individual unreadable entries and records the errors. |
bin/jornada-setup-passwordless is an opt-in convenience that removes the
per-connect admin prompt. It is designed to keep the privilege it grants as
narrow as possible:
- It installs two root-owned helper scripts (
jornada-connect/jornada-disconnect) to/usr/local/libexec/jornada-link/, and asudoers.drule granting the invoking user passwordlesssudofor exactly those two commands — nothing else. - The helpers take no arguments (so the rule can't be widened at the call
site), never source or execute anything from a user-writable location
(their only config is the root-owned
/usr/local/etc/jornada-link/config, which is parsed, not sourced), and validate the serial device path before it reachespppd. - The generated
sudoersfile is validated withvisudo -cfbefore it is installed, and removed cleanly by--uninstall.
The trade-off: any process running as your user can now bring the PPP link up as root without authenticating. On a single-user machine that is a small, well-scoped increase in local attack surface; on a shared machine, prefer the default admin prompt. Installing it still requires your password once.
- No link confidentiality/authentication beyond the CE password — inherent to the protocol; mitigated by the physical point-to-point cable.
- Local privilege: bringing up PPP needs
sudo/admin. The helper script is generated in the user's own~/.jornada-linkand validated, but any process already running as that user could tamper with it — this is the standard single-user desktop trust model.