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deploy(vera): her own Infisical connection (machine identity) + an alert path no session can disarm #46

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Merged
mabry1985 merged 1 commit into from
Aug 24, 2026
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deploy(vera): her own Infisical connection (machine identity) + an alert path no session can disarm #46

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42 changes: 42 additions & 0 deletions deploy/vera.langgraph-config.yaml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -67,3 +67,45 @@ pr_reviewer:
shadow_mode: false
promotion_owner: true
default_repo: ""

# External secrets (ADR 0080) — Vera fetches her own runtime secrets from Infisical
# using a UNIVERSAL-AUTH MACHINE IDENTITY, instead of having them injected once at
# `docker compose up` by a human's `infisical run` session.
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS. The injected-at-deploy shape has two silent failure modes, and we
# hit both. (1) A human CLI session expires — on 2026-08-21 ava's had, and the fleet
# watchdogs had been running for two cycles WITHOUT `DISCORD_WEBHOOK_ALERTS`, which
# means every alarm they could have raised would have gone to a log file instead of
# Discord. The guard was disarmed and nothing said so. (2) Injected env is a SNAPSHOT:
# rotate a secret in the vault and the running container keeps the old value until
# someone remembers to recreate it. A machine identity has no session to expire, and
# `refresh_seconds` re-fetches, so rotation propagates on its own.
#
# HOST HAS NO `/api` SUFFIX. The CLI's `--domain` wants `https://secrets.proto-labs.ai/api`;
# this provider appends `/api/v1/...` itself, so the same value here 404s. Verified by
# probing both shapes against the live server (bare host → 401 = endpoint found and
# credentials rejected; with /api → 404).
#
# CREDENTIALS COME FROM ENV, never this file: INFISICAL_CLIENT_ID / INFISICAL_CLIENT_SECRET
# (the provider's `bootstrap_env`). They are also PROTECTED — no fetched value can
# overwrite them, so the identity cannot rotate itself out of existence mid-run.
#
# `required: true` is deliberate. With the secrets moved out of compose, a failed fetch
# means no GitHub App key and no gateway key: she would boot and then fail every review
# for reasons visible only in her own logs. Fail-fast makes it a restart loop the
# healthcheck reports, which is the loud version of the same fact.
#
# NOT hydrated here: `A2A_AUTH_TOKEN`. The operator bearer is how you reach the API to
# FIX a broken secrets connection — putting it behind that connection locks the door
# with the key inside. It stays in compose.
secrets_manager:
enabled: true
provider: infisical
host: https://secrets.proto-labs.ai
project_id: 8da5101a-4bde-4c9b-a42a-76da1965f2fe
environment: prod
path: /
recursive: true
refresh_seconds: 300
required: true
override_env: false
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