Keep the Scope Probe Out of an Inherited Environment, and Route wait Through the Owner Check - #1583
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Fixes #1561. origin_owner() ran `git -C <script dir> remote get-url origin` with no `env=`, so it inherited the caller's environment. Git honors GIT_DIR over `-C` for repository discovery, so an inherited GIT_DIR (set by a git hook, `git bisect run`, or `git rebase --exec`) made the probe answer for a different repository than the one the script sits in, which could make the write-scope check pass or fail for the wrong owner. Strip exactly GIT_DIR, GIT_WORK_TREE, GIT_COMMON_DIR, and GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY from the subprocess environment before running the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes #1562. in_scope() had exactly two call sites, comment_on_pr and reply_to_thread, but the wait path in main() called request_copilot_review (a requestReviews GraphQL mutation) without ever passing through it. Add the same scope check before wait does any work, so a cross-owner target exits 64, prints "status=OUT_OF_SCOPE", and issues no network call at all. Document exit code 64 in wait's own docstring alongside its other exit codes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…edes the reads Two claims in the previous two commits described the change more confidently than the code supports. The probe's comment justified stripping four names rather than clearing the environment by naming credentials and proxy settings, which a local `git remote get-url` never reaches. What it actually needs from the environment is PATH, to be found at all, and HOME, to read the very config it is reading. The second discovery case was named for stripping GIT_WORK_TREE, GIT_COMMON_DIR and GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY, and it proves no such thing: it sets GIT_DIR alongside them, so it fails on an unstripped environment for the reason the first case already covers. Only GIT_DIR is shown to redirect `remote get-url` away from a `-C` argument, so a case per name would assert a redirection the other three are not demonstrated to produce. The case now says it pins the set inherited at once, which is what it holds. The wait comment dated itself against the state before the fix, which stops being readable the moment that state is gone. It now says why the refusal sits ahead of the first read instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Delete the false claim that a hook, `git bisect run`, and `git rebase --exec` export GIT_DIR, from both the strip's comment in `origin_owner()` and the matching test docstring; state only the checkable mechanism, that an inherited GIT_DIR overrides `-C` for repository discovery. Give `TestOriginOwnerIgnoresInheritedGitDiscovery.make_repo` an environment stripped of the same four discovery names `origin_owner` strips, so its `git init`/`git remote add` calls build the throwaway repos regardless of what the caller inherited, rather than mutating whatever repository an inherited GIT_DIR happens to name. Add a case proving GIT_COMMON_DIR alone redirects the probe the same way GIT_DIR does, and rewrite the "whole set" docstring to say only what the cases prove: GIT_DIR and GIT_COMMON_DIR each redirect on their own, GIT_WORK_TREE and GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY are stripped as part of the same set without a demonstrated redirect for this call. Update scripts/README.md's exit-64 paragraph to name `wait` alongside `comment` and `reply`, since `wait` now refuses a cross-owner target before its auto-request the same way the other two do. Add a table-driven test asserting `comment`, `reply`, and `wait` each refuse a cross-owner target before touching either transport. The existing whole-source check only counts which mutation documents exist, which is how `requestReviews` sat outside the owner check for its whole life with a green suite; the new test pins the command-level invariant instead and says in its own docstring that it does not pin the static "every mutation document sits behind in_scope" property. Not included: switching the probe from `git remote get-url origin` to `git config --get remote.origin.url` closes the `insteadOf` vector but not the write boundary itself. `config --get` is redirectable through a different, more direct injection: GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0 set directly to `remote.origin.url` overrides local repo config for that key, measured on git 2.47.3, where `remote get-url` does not honor that same env-based override. Reported rather than shipped, since the task that requested this swap says to stop rather than invent a third approach when `config --get` also turns out redirectable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…in_owner git remote get-url applies insteadOf rewriting, so an inherited config rewrite can make the probe name an owner the checkout does not have. git config --local --get reads this repository's own config file directly, which is the question origin_owner() is actually asking: which owner does the checkout this script sits in belong to. The existing GIT_DIR/GIT_COMMON_DIR/GIT_WORK_TREE/GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY environment strip stays required for a separate reason: it decides which repository's local config is read, while --local decides which scope of that repository's config is read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Switching the probe to `git config --local --get remote.origin.url` left four surfaces still naming `git remote get-url origin`: the function's own docstring, both refusal messages a reader sees when a write is refused, and the exit-64 paragraph in the scripts README. A refusal that names a command the script does not run sends a reader to reproduce something that cannot reproduce the refusal. The assertion pinning the refusal's text moves with it, and one test docstring that described which variables redirect `remote get-url` now says the probe instead, since the measurement holds for whichever command the probe runs. Three mentions of the old command survive deliberately: the comment giving the reason the probe does not use it, and the two cases that name it as the command they revert to in order to prove a vector. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`git config --local --get remote.origin.url` was itself wrong in three ways: it reads the LAST of multiple `url` entries where `remote get-url` reads the FIRST (an inversion that widens write scope under two origin urls), it does not follow `include.path`/`includeIf`, and a URL-shorthand alias origin yields nothing to parse. Go back to `git remote get-url origin` and close the injection vector at its actual source: strip the four discovery variables plus every GIT_CONFIG*-prefixed name from the probe's environment instead. Also corrects four false claims from prior rounds: an unpinned "four names stripped as a set" test docstring, a `wait` comment that misdescribed why the scope check precedes the read, a README line describing the auto-request as inside `wait`'s backoff loop, and a test class named for only the discovery half of what it covers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewrites the origin_owner() env-strip comment to state its actual limit (closes inherited discovery/GIT_CONFIG* channels, cannot close a caller- controlled HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME/PATH), fixes a test class docstring's false claim that all four stripped names override discovery, corrects a maintenance note to name the real trigger for a stale write-command table (a subcommand's write status changing, not only one being added), adds README `wait` coverage for exit 64, corrects a README sentence that understated the mutation-document count the whole-source test actually pins, and makes three test docstrings self-contained against a squash merge instead of pointing at this branch's own intermediate commits. Adds one new assertion tying WRITE_COMMANDS/READ_ONLY_COMMANDS to the parser's own `cmd` choices, so a subcommand added without being classified fails the suite instead of silently falling through both sets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR hardens Git repository-owner discovery, adds an owner-scope preflight to ChangesScope enforcement
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Severity of issue fixed: Medium Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This change adds a safety check so the 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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The change is narrowly scoped, improves safety/correctness, and is backed by targeted regression tests for the previously unguarded behaviors.
Pull request overview
This PR hardens scripts/pr_review.py's in-process write-scope enforcement by preventing inherited Git environment variables from redirecting the scope probe, and by ensuring wait routes through the same owner check as the other write paths.
Changes:
- Strip Git discovery variables and
GIT_CONFIG*variables when probingorigin_owner()sogit -Ccannot be redirected by an inherited environment. - Refuse out-of-scope targets on the
waitcommand (exit64) before any GitHub read/mutation occurs. - Add regression tests covering the environment-strip behavior,
waitscope refusal, and command classification; update docs to reflectwait's mutation surface and scope refusal.
File summaries
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| scripts/pr_review.py | Strips inherited Git env for the scope probe and applies in_scope() to wait before any GitHub I/O. |
| scripts/tests/test_pr_review.py | Adds end-to-end regression tests for the env stripping and for wait/write-command out-of-scope refusal. |
| scripts/README.md | Updates wait documentation to reflect requestReviews as a mutation and the new out-of-scope exit behavior. |
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In `@scripts/tests/test_pr_review.py`:
- Line 4216: Update the test environment construction in make_repo to exclude
inherited GIT_CONFIG* variables, including GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL, alongside the
existing _DISCOVERY_VARS filtering. Ensure git remote add origin runs with the
sanitized environment before origin_owner() is invoked.
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…ns on The fixture stripped the four discovery names and left every GIT_CONFIG channel in place, so it isolated itself from half of what the probe isolates itself from. The two halves have to match: a fixture built under an influence the cases exist to rule out is a fixture that cannot rule it out. Three call sites built that environment inline with the same comprehension, which is how they came to disagree with the probe in the first place, so they now share one helper and a later change to the rule reaches all of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ironment (#1584) Promotes one commit from `develop` to `main`. - `7e39cb8` Keep the Scope Probe Out of an Inherited Environment, and Route wait Through the Owner Check (#1583) `origin_owner()` resolves the owner a write may target, and `in_scope()` refuses a write to any other owner. Two holes, both reached through the invoking environment rather than through anything in the tree. The probe inherited its environment unchanged, and git honours `GIT_DIR` over the `-C` argument for repository discovery, so an inherited one made it answer for whatever repository that variable named. `GIT_COMMON_DIR` does the same, the config being read from the common dir. The admitting direction is the one worth fixing: either variable naming a repository under the target's owner while the script itself sits in a checkout under a different one, so `in_scope()` returns true on a comparison that never described the script's checkout. Separately, `wait` requested a Copilot review before its first poll, and that request is a `requestReviews` mutation that never passed through the owner check at all, so a cross-owner `wait` issued a state-changing call under the logged-in identity while the refusal that stops the same target on `reply` never fired. The probe now runs without the four discovery names and without any name starting with `GIT_CONFIG`, the second as a prefix test rather than a list, since `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_n` has no fixed upper bound and no enumeration of literal names can be complete. `wait` refuses a cross-owner target outright, exit `64`, ahead of its first read rather than at the request, so all three write paths state one rule. What the strip does not close is stated in the code rather than left to inference: an inherited `HOME`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` or `PATH` delivers the same rewrite, and a caller controlling any of those already controls the process that would perform the write. An intermediate design probing with `git config --local --get remote.origin.url` was reverted, because it inverted the boundary on an origin carrying more than one `url`, where `remote get-url` takes the first and `config --get` the last, and because `--local` follows no `include.path`. Two cases pin those shapes against a return to that command. Copilot reviewed the feature pull request at its merged head, full coverage, approval recommended, no findings and none suppressed. CodeRabbit reviewed the round before it and raised one finding, fixed and resolved on the feature pull request before it merged, then reported itself rate limited on the final head. Closes #1561 Closes #1562
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Closes #1561. Closes #1562.
The defects
origin_owner()resolves the owner a write may target by runninggitagainst the script's own directory, andin_scope()compares the target against it. Two holes, both reached through the invoking environment rather than through anything in the tree.The probe answered for the wrong repository (#1561). The call inherited the environment unchanged, and git honours
GIT_DIRover the-Cargument for repository discovery, so an inherited one made the probe answer for whatever repository it named.GIT_COMMON_DIRdoes the same, since the config is read from the common dir. Both directions are reachable, and the one worth fixing is the admitting one:GIT_DIRnaming a repository under the target's owner while the script itself sits in a checkout under a different one, soin_scope()returns true on a comparison that never described the script's checkout.One write path never reached the check (#1562).
waitrequests a Copilot review before its first poll, and that request is arequestReviewsmutation.in_scope()had exactly two call sites, incomment_on_prandreply_to_thread, and the request path had none, sowaiton a repository under another owner issued a state-changing call under the logged-in identity while the refusal that stops the same target onreplynever fired.What this changes
The probe runs on a stripped environment.
git remote get-url originnow runs without the four discovery names, and without any name starting withGIT_CONFIG. The second category is a prefix test rather than a list, becauseGIT_CONFIG_KEY_nhas no fixed upper bound, so no enumeration of literal names can be complete.waitrefuses a cross-owner target outright, exit64, ahead of its first read rather than at the request, so a refused run neither writes nor reads. All three write paths now state one rule, which is what makesscripts/README.md's "the owner check is also enforced in-process" true without qualification.What this deliberately does not do
The strip closes the channels an inherited tooling environment sets. It does not close an inherited
HOME,XDG_CONFIG_HOME, orPATH, and it cannot: those deliver the sameinsteadOfinjection, and stripping them would either breaksafe.directoryor make the probe ignore a global config a legitimate user really has. A caller controlling any of the three already controls the process that would perform the write, so there is nothing left for this check to defend. The comment above the strip says so rather than leaving a reader to infer completeness from a name list.A design that was tried and reverted
An intermediate version probed with
git config --local --get remote.origin.url, which does close theinsteadOfvector. It was reverted, because a review pass proved three defects a reviewer is likely to rediscover:[remote "origin"]may carry more than oneurl, which is ordinary documented config.remote get-urlreturns the first, git's own fetch identity;config --getreturns the last. So the scope anchor moved to the second owner, and a write to that owner was admitted where it had been refused.--localdoes not followinclude.path, so a checkout configuring its origin through an include read as no owner and every write refused.Two cases pin the first two shapes against a return to that command.
Correcting the issue text
#1561 motivates the fix by saying a git hook,
git bisect run, andgit rebase --execeach exportGIT_DIR. Measured against this host's git, none of the three does: apre-commithook receivesGIT_AUTHOR_*,GIT_EDITOR,GIT_EXEC_PATH,GIT_INDEX_FILEandGIT_PREFIXand noGIT_DIR, andpost-commit,post-checkout,bisect runandrebase --execall leave it unset. The fix stands on its own, since an inheritedGIT_DIRgenuinely overrides-Cwhatever sets it, but the provenance was deleted rather than narrowed so a reader who re-derives it does not conclude the guard is unnecessary.Verification
Every behavioral claim was proved against a reverted fix rather than trusted. Reverting
env=fails five of the eight environment cases; reverting thewaitguard fails both refusal cases at the first GraphQL call. One case is documented as not being a regression guard for any reverted state here, becauseremote get-urlignores the injection it covers.Beyond the new cases, the probe was driven through the real
origin_owner()under each ofGIT_DIR,GIT_COMMON_DIR,GIT_CONFIG_COUNT(as aninsteadOfrewrite and as a direct override),GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL,GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM,GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERSandGIT_CONFIG, answering the anchor owner every time, and through the multi-url andinclude.pathshapes that broke the reverted design.A test-setup defect of the same class was fixed alongside: the helper building the throwaway repositories shelled out to
git initandgit remote addon the inherited environment, so under an ambientGIT_DIRthe cases errored and theremote addwrote anorigininto whatever repository that variable named.One further test pins the command table to the parser's own
cmdchoices.waitbecame a write by acquiring a mutation rather than by being added, so a table keyed to "a new subcommand appeared" would not have caught it.Known and not addressed here
#1582,
in_scope()'s no-owner refusal gives one remedy for several unrelated probe failures.waitrefusing on the same terms is what makes it matter, since an absent git or an inheritedGIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIESnow ends a read-only poll with advice that does not fit the cause.Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
waitcommand returns exit code 64 when the target is out of scope.Documentation
wait,comment, andreply.