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Backport a few patches for v0.8.11 - #623
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
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| Layer / File(s) | Summary |
|---|---|
Reject negative remaining-buffer sizes src/tpm2/Unmarshal.c |
UINT8_Unmarshal, UINT16_Unmarshal, UINT32_Unmarshal, UINT64_Unmarshal, and Array_Unmarshal return TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT before reading or copying data when *size is negative. |
Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes
Merge Risk: 
Minimal · up to 4ab38
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TPM unmarshaling now rejects invalid negative buffer sizes before processing data, preventing unsafe length conversion and memory access. The change is ready to merge.
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1
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❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
Check name Status Explanation Resolution Docstring Coverage ⚠️ WarningDocstring coverage is 0.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 5 functions across 1 files. Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold. ✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Check name Status Explanation Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. Title check ✅ Passed The title accurately identifies the primary change as backporting patches for the v0.8.11 release. It is concise and relevant, although it does not describe the negative-size validation details. Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
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…rypt
TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt (AES path in src/tpm12/tpm_crypto.c,
OpenSSL backend; and the NSS/FreeBL backend in
src/tpm12/tpm_crypto_freebl.c) only checked
encrypt_length < TPM_AES_BLOCK_SIZE before calling
AES_cbc_encrypt(..., AES_DECRYPT) on a buffer allocated to exactly
encrypt_length bytes. CBC decryption always consumes a whole final
block, so a length that is not a multiple of 16 makes OpenSSL read up
to 15 bytes past the end of the input buffer.
That length is TPM_CONTEXT_BLOB.sensitiveData.size from the command
stream. TPM_Process_LoadKeyContext and TPM_Process_LoadAuthContext run
under TPM_CHECK_ALLOW_NO_OWNER and decrypt the blob with the permanent
contextKey before the integrity HMAC is checked, so the over-read is
reachable with a single unauthenticated command.
Reproduced with a TPM_LoadKeyContext command whose sensitiveData.size
is 17; AddressSanitizer reports a heap over-read:
READ of size 4 ...
#0 AES_decrypt aes_core.c
#1 CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt cbc128.c
#2 TPM_SymmetricKeyData_Decrypt tpm_crypto.c
#3 TPM_Process_LoadKeyContext tpm_session.c
The fix rejects a length that is not a whole number of blocks, the same
requirement the DES backend already enforces. The command then returns
TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR. A zero length is still rejected by TPM_Malloc().
Signed-off-by: sameera <sameera@research.itecz.au>
TPM_Sha1Context_Load() (OpenSSL backend, src/tpm12/tpm_crypto.c)
deserializes the OpenSSL SHA_CTX from a TPMLIB_SetState(VOLATILE) blob
and restores sha_ctx->num with TPM_Load32() without any range check.
num is the number of bytes buffered in sha_ctx->data and OpenSSL uses
it as the write offset in SHA1_Update()/SHA1_Final(): the update path
runs memcpy(p + num, data, SHA_CBLOCK - num). A restored num >=
SHA_CBLOCK makes SHA_CBLOCK - num wrap to a huge size_t, so the next
update writes far past the heap-allocated context, and SHA1_Final()
writes the 0x80 pad byte at p[num] well outside it.
The restored sha1_context / sha1_context_tis are later driven by the
TPM_SHA1Update command and by the host-side TPM_IO_Hash_Data(), both of
which reach TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd() -> SHA1_Update(). The volatile-state
blob is only protected by an unkeyed SHA1 integrity digest computed
after parsing, so num is attacker-controlled across a state restore.
Reproduced by loading a SHA1 context with num = 256 and then issuing
one update; AddressSanitizer reports a wrapped copy:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param: (size=-192)
#0 memcpy
#1 SHA1_Update
#2 TPM_SHA1UpdateCmd tpm_crypto.c:2028
Reject num >= SHA_CBLOCK with TPM_BAD_PARAMETER and free the
partially loaded context, the same num bound the TPM 2.0 hash-state
unmarshalers already enforce. The FreeBL backend loads into a
fixed-layout struct guarded by a flatten-size check and does not
restore a write offset, so only the OpenSSL path is affected.
Signed-off-by: sameera <sameera@research.itecz.au>
This PR backports a few patches for v0.8.11
Summary by CodeRabbit