fix(ci): do not persist the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard

[yakimoto]

Why

actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false writes the job's GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config, where any later step — or anything those steps execute — can read it. This is the
security gate that DOWNLOADS AND EXECUTES the gitleaks binary, and the workflow's own comment
already reasons about tampered downloads ("so a tampered or MITM'd download can never execute
inside the security gate"), so the threat model is written down and only the credential half of
the mitigation is missing. Found by zizmor as warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts.

Safety

Verified this job only: checks out, installs gitleaks (pinned + checksum), runs
gitleaks detect --no-git, installs ripgrep, runs content-policy.sh. permissions: contents: read. Nothing pushes, calls gh, or reads GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN, so the token was never needed
in .git/config in the first place.

Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1870.

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[qodo-code-review]

PR Summary by Qodo

CI: prevent GITHUB_TOKEN persistence in public-repo guard checkout

🐞 Bug fix ⚙️ Configuration changes 🕐 Less than 10 minutes

AI Description

• Disable credential persistence during checkout in the public-repo guard workflow.
• Prevent later steps from reading GITHUB_TOKEN from ".git/config".
• Align the workflow with its existing “tamper-resistant execution” threat model.

Diagram

graph TD
  A["public-repo-guard job"] --> B["actions/checkout (no creds)"] --> D["Install gitleaks (verified)"] --> E["gitleaks scan (--no-git)"] --> F["content policy scan"]
  B -.-> C[".git/config"]

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High-Level Assessment

Using actions/checkout with persist-credentials: false is the most direct and standard mitigation for preventing GITHUB_TOKEN from being written to .git/config in jobs that don’t need it. Alternatives like setting an explicit token or restructuring steps don’t improve safety meaningfully here given contents:read and no push/gh usage.

Files changed (1) +2 / -0

Other (1) +2 / -0

public-repo-guard.ymlDisable checkout credential persistence for the guard job +2/-0

Disable checkout credential persistence for the guard job

• Configures actions/checkout to use persist-credentials: false so the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN is not stored in .git/config. This reduces token exposure to subsequent steps, including the step that downloads and executes the gitleaks binary.

.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Approved e81e668

This is a minor CI security hardening change that adds persist-credentials: false to a checkout action, following GitHub Actions best practices. The change is made by the designated code owner and has no runtime impact.

^{You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more.}

[devin-ai-integration]

✅ Devin Review: No Issues Found

Devin Review analyzed this PR and found no bugs or issues to report.

[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 1 file

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

_{Re-trigger cubic}

[qodo-code-review]

Code Review by Qodo

🐞 Bugs (0) 📘 Rule violations (0) 📎 Requirement gaps (0)

Great, no issues found!

Qodo reviewed your code and found no material issues that require review

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[qodo-code-review]

Qodo Fixer

No findings are available for this PR yet. Findings appear here once Qodo has reviewed the PR.

[yakimoto]

This PR is redundant with #16 (chore/guard-canonical-sync), which is already open and already contains this exact change.

Evidence — #16's diff to .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml includes:

+          # tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
+          # so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
+          persist-credentials: false

#16 is also broader than this PR: it syncs the whole vendored public-repo-guard trio to
the canonical source (wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard) byte-for-byte, verified by
git blob SHA, rather than adding this one line in isolation.

Closing as redundant. This duplicate exists because the fan-out that opened this PR
(refs claude-workstation#1870) did not check for in-flight PRs touching the same file before
going out — #16 was already open. Merge #16 instead.